钱谈判?制裁在欧盟“法治”冲突中的有效性

IF 3.3 1区 社会学 Q1 ECONOMICS
Adam Holesch, Clara Portela
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引用次数: 0

摘要

针对匈牙利和波兰的民主倒退,欧洲联盟(EU)实施了一套制裁工具箱,其中包括《欧盟条约》(TEU)第7条机制、侵权程序和资助条件。虽然第7条TEU程序已被广泛研究并发现无效,但侵权程序的效力和最近引入的资金条件-包括条件法规,恢复和弹性基金以及共同规定法规-仍然鲜为人知。根据制裁奖学金,我们确定了制裁有效性的两个核心决定因素:实施制裁的可信度及其经济成本。然后,我们通过测试四个假设来探讨它们如何影响欧盟引入的制裁机制的有效性。研究结果表明,侵权程序和资助条件仅部分有效。这种比较分析增强了我们对可以缓解民主治理衰退的强制机制的理解。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Money Talks? The Effectiveness of Sanctions in the ‘Rule of Law’ Conflict in the European Union

The European Union (EU) responded to democratic backsliding in Hungary and Poland by implementing a sanctions toolbox, which includes the Article 7 Treaty on European Union (TEU) mechanism, infringement procedures and funding conditionality. Whilst the Article 7 TEU procedure has been extensively studies and found to be ineffective, the efficacy of infringement procedures and the recently introduced funding conditionality – comprising the Conditionality Regulation, the Recovery and Resilience Facility and the Common Provisions Regulation – remains less understood. Drawing on the sanctions scholarship, we identify two central determinants for sanction effectiveness: the credibility of sanctions imposition and their economic costs. We then explore how they influence the effectiveness of the sanction mechanisms introduced by the EU by testing four hypotheses. The findings indicate that both infringement procedures and funding conditionality are only partially effective. This comparative analysis enhances our understanding of coercive mechanisms that can mitigate decline in democratic governance.

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来源期刊
CiteScore
5.30
自引率
18.20%
发文量
137
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