MWRS:一种基于mab的基于三方Stackelberg博弈的可靠移动众测员工招聘方案

IF 7.7 2区 计算机科学 Q1 COMPUTER SCIENCE, INFORMATION SYSTEMS
Yan Ouyang;Feng Zeng;Neal N. Xiong;Anfeng Liu;Witold Pedrycz
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引用次数: 0

摘要

移动群体感知(MCS)已经成为数据感知和收集的一个引人注目的范例,它利用了移动设备的广泛采用和众多用户的积极参与。尽管具有潜力,但MCS面临着严峻的挑战,特别是在招聘可靠的工人和获取高质量的传感数据方面。现有的方法大多假设了工人素质的先验信息,容易受到共谋攻击,特别是没有全面考虑工人的可靠性和稳定性。为了解决这些问题,我们提出了一种基于多武装强盗(MAB)的工人招聘方案(MWRS),该方案与MCS的三方Stackelberg博弈(TSG)相结合。具体而言,引入了信任评估和真相推理机制,通过主动真相检测来评估工作人员的可信度。为了提高招聘质量,我们采用了一种信任感知的工人选择机制,该机制利用了改进的上置信度界(UCB)算法,在探索和利用之间实现了最佳平衡。此外,参与者之间的互动使用TSG框架建模,该框架制定了各自的收益,以确定最优决策策略,从而实现互利共赢的结果。对真实世界数据集的广泛评估表明,与现有方法相比,我们提出的方案将总质量提高了30.8%,并减少了80.3%的遗憾。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
MWRS: A MAB-Based Worker Recruitment Scheme With Tripartite Stackelberg Game for Reliable Mobile Crowdsensing
Mobile Crowdsensing (MCS) has emerged as a compelling paradigm for data sensing and collection, leveraging the widespread adoption of mobile devices and the active participation of numerous users. Despite its potential, MCS faces critical challenges, particularly in recruiting reliable workers and acquiring high-quality sensing data. Most existing approaches assume prior information on worker quality and are vulnerable to collusion attacks, especially having not comprehensively considered workers’ reliability and stability. To address these problems, we propose a Multi-Armed Bandit (MAB) based Worker Recruitment Scheme (MWRS) integrated with the Tripartite Stackelberg Game (TSG) for MCS. Specifically, a trust evaluation and truth inference mechanism is introduced to assess the trustworthiness of workers through active truth detection. To enhance recruitment quality, we employ a trust-aware worker selection mechanism that utilizes a modified Upper Confidence Bound (UCB) algorithm, achieving an optimal balance between exploration and exploitation. Furthermore, the interactions among participants are modeled using a TSG framework, which formulates their respective payoffs to determine optimal decision-making strategies, thus achieving mutually beneficial outcomes. Extensive evaluations on real-world datasets demonstrate that our proposed scheme improves total quality by up to 30.8% and reduces regret by up to 80.3% compared to existing methods.
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来源期刊
IEEE Transactions on Mobile Computing
IEEE Transactions on Mobile Computing 工程技术-电信学
CiteScore
12.90
自引率
2.50%
发文量
403
审稿时长
6.6 months
期刊介绍: IEEE Transactions on Mobile Computing addresses key technical issues related to various aspects of mobile computing. This includes (a) architectures, (b) support services, (c) algorithm/protocol design and analysis, (d) mobile environments, (e) mobile communication systems, (f) applications, and (g) emerging technologies. Topics of interest span a wide range, covering aspects like mobile networks and hosts, mobility management, multimedia, operating system support, power management, online and mobile environments, security, scalability, reliability, and emerging technologies such as wearable computers, body area networks, and wireless sensor networks. The journal serves as a comprehensive platform for advancements in mobile computing research.
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