{"title":"但是为什么呢?儿童对解释的必要性的信念","authors":"Teresa Flanagan , Alejandro Vesga , Tamar Kushnir , Shaun Nichols","doi":"10.1016/j.jecp.2025.106317","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>Children exhibit sophisticated explanatory judgments: they expect, value, and judge explanations of salient facts. Do children also believe that everything must have an explanation? If so, they would exhibit a metaphysical explanatory judgment conforming to what philosophers have called the Principle of Sufficient Reason (PSR). In this study, 6–9-year-old children (<em>N</em> = 80, <em>M<sub>age</sub></em> = 7.92, <em>SD<sub>age</sub></em> = 1.21) were shown statements across domains (Psychology, Biology, Nature, Physics, Religion, and Supernatural). For each statement, children were asked if they agree with a person who says there must be an explanation, even if we do not know it, or with a person who says there may not be an explanation. As a comparison, children were also asked about coincidences, which should not necessitate an explanation under the PSR. Results suggest that indeed children conform to the PSR: children of all ages believed that the statements must have an explanation. Notably, 7–9-year-olds thought coincidences do not have to have an explanation, while 6-year-olds did not differ between the statements and coincidences. This is the first step at uncovering a developmental change in our metaphysical explanatory judgments.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48391,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Experimental Child Psychology","volume":"260 ","pages":"Article 106317"},"PeriodicalIF":1.8000,"publicationDate":"2025-06-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"But Why?: Children’s belief in the necessity of explanations\",\"authors\":\"Teresa Flanagan , Alejandro Vesga , Tamar Kushnir , Shaun Nichols\",\"doi\":\"10.1016/j.jecp.2025.106317\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"<div><div>Children exhibit sophisticated explanatory judgments: they expect, value, and judge explanations of salient facts. Do children also believe that everything must have an explanation? If so, they would exhibit a metaphysical explanatory judgment conforming to what philosophers have called the Principle of Sufficient Reason (PSR). In this study, 6–9-year-old children (<em>N</em> = 80, <em>M<sub>age</sub></em> = 7.92, <em>SD<sub>age</sub></em> = 1.21) were shown statements across domains (Psychology, Biology, Nature, Physics, Religion, and Supernatural). For each statement, children were asked if they agree with a person who says there must be an explanation, even if we do not know it, or with a person who says there may not be an explanation. As a comparison, children were also asked about coincidences, which should not necessitate an explanation under the PSR. Results suggest that indeed children conform to the PSR: children of all ages believed that the statements must have an explanation. Notably, 7–9-year-olds thought coincidences do not have to have an explanation, while 6-year-olds did not differ between the statements and coincidences. This is the first step at uncovering a developmental change in our metaphysical explanatory judgments.</div></div>\",\"PeriodicalId\":48391,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Journal of Experimental Child Psychology\",\"volume\":\"260 \",\"pages\":\"Article 106317\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":1.8000,\"publicationDate\":\"2025-06-02\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"0\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Journal of Experimental Child Psychology\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"102\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0022096525001237\",\"RegionNum\":2,\"RegionCategory\":\"心理学\",\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"Q3\",\"JCRName\":\"PSYCHOLOGY, DEVELOPMENTAL\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Journal of Experimental Child Psychology","FirstCategoryId":"102","ListUrlMain":"https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0022096525001237","RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q3","JCRName":"PSYCHOLOGY, DEVELOPMENTAL","Score":null,"Total":0}
But Why?: Children’s belief in the necessity of explanations
Children exhibit sophisticated explanatory judgments: they expect, value, and judge explanations of salient facts. Do children also believe that everything must have an explanation? If so, they would exhibit a metaphysical explanatory judgment conforming to what philosophers have called the Principle of Sufficient Reason (PSR). In this study, 6–9-year-old children (N = 80, Mage = 7.92, SDage = 1.21) were shown statements across domains (Psychology, Biology, Nature, Physics, Religion, and Supernatural). For each statement, children were asked if they agree with a person who says there must be an explanation, even if we do not know it, or with a person who says there may not be an explanation. As a comparison, children were also asked about coincidences, which should not necessitate an explanation under the PSR. Results suggest that indeed children conform to the PSR: children of all ages believed that the statements must have an explanation. Notably, 7–9-year-olds thought coincidences do not have to have an explanation, while 6-year-olds did not differ between the statements and coincidences. This is the first step at uncovering a developmental change in our metaphysical explanatory judgments.
期刊介绍:
The Journal of Experimental Child Psychology is an excellent source of information concerning all aspects of the development of children. It includes empirical psychological research on cognitive, social/emotional, and physical development. In addition, the journal periodically publishes Special Topic issues.