具有候选地点的设施位置博弈的预测机制设计

IF 1.1 4区 数学 Q4 COMPUTER SCIENCE, INTERDISCIPLINARY APPLICATIONS
Jiazhu Fang, Qizhi Fang, Wenjing Liu, Qingqin Nong, Alexandros A. Voudouris
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引用次数: 0

摘要

我们在单一(令人讨厌的)设施选址博弈中研究了带预测的机制设计,候选地点在真实线上,这补充了现有的带预测的机制设计文献。我们首先考虑具有候选位置的单一设施位置博弈,其中每个代理都希望设施(例如,学校)位于尽可能靠近她的位置。我们研究了两个社会目标:最小化最大成本和社会成本,并提供确定性、匿名和群体策略证明机制,这些机制的预测分别在一致性和鲁棒性之间实现了最佳的权衡。此外,我们将近似比率表示为预测误差的函数,表明即使在预测不完全准确的情况下,机制也可以实现更好的性能。我们还考虑了具有候选位置的单个令人讨厌的设施位置博弈,其中每个代理都希望设施(例如,垃圾转运站)位于离她尽可能远的地方。以最小效用最大化为目标,证明了任何具有预测的防策略机制都是无界鲁棒的。为了实现社会效用最大化的目标,我们提供了一种确定性的、匿名的、具有预测能力的群体策略证明机制,在一致性和鲁棒性之间实现了最佳的权衡。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Mechanism Design with Predictions for Facility Location Games with Candidate Locations

We study mechanism design with predictions in the single (obnoxious) facility location games with candidate locations on the real line, which complements the existing literature on mechanism design with predictions. We first consider the single facility location games with candidate locations, where each agent prefers the facility (e.g., a school) to be located as close to her as possible. We study two social objectives: minimizing the maximum cost and the social cost, and provide deterministic, anonymous, and group strategy-proof mechanisms with predictions that achieve the best possible trade-offs between consistency and robustness, respectively. Additionally, we represent the approximation ratio as a function of the prediction error, indicating that mechanisms can achieve better performance even when predictions are not fully accurate. We also consider the single obnoxious facility location games with candidate locations, where each agent prefers the facility (e.g., a garbage transfer station) to be located as far away from her as possible. For the objective of maximizing the minimum utility, we prove that any strategy-proof mechanism with predictions is unbounded robust. For the objective of maximizing the social utility, we provide a deterministic, anonymous, and group strategy-proof mechanism with prediction that achieves the best possible trade-off between consistency and robustness.

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来源期刊
Journal of Combinatorial Optimization
Journal of Combinatorial Optimization 数学-计算机:跨学科应用
CiteScore
2.00
自引率
10.00%
发文量
83
审稿时长
6 months
期刊介绍: The objective of Journal of Combinatorial Optimization is to advance and promote the theory and applications of combinatorial optimization, which is an area of research at the intersection of applied mathematics, computer science, and operations research and which overlaps with many other areas such as computation complexity, computational biology, VLSI design, communication networks, and management science. It includes complexity analysis and algorithm design for combinatorial optimization problems, numerical experiments and problem discovery with applications in science and engineering. The Journal of Combinatorial Optimization publishes refereed papers dealing with all theoretical, computational and applied aspects of combinatorial optimization. It also publishes reviews of appropriate books and special issues of journals.
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