固定投资与动态投资：与竞争企业家的最优契约

IF 6.9 2区经济学 Q1 BUSINESS, FINANCE

Finance Research Letters Pub Date : 2025-05-13 DOI:10.1016/j.frl.2025.107495

Liyuan Wang , Chuan Ding , Zhiyu Wang , Siyuan Zeng

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引用次数: 0

摘要

本研究探讨风险投资中的动态契约，其中企业家报酬整合了绝对绩效和相对绩效。我们发现了一个基于创业效率的投资策略悖论：固定资本适合高效的创业公司，而动态投资有利于低效的创业公司。如果风险资本家能够转换策略，从早期动态投资转向固定配置，将会提高收益。我们还研究了公平与竞争激励之间的权衡关系，发现竞争激励在高相关性和高不确定性的情况下会增强，这与标准代理理论有所不同。这些见解有助于平衡努力、激励和优化风险投资融资策略。

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Fixed versus dynamic investment: Optimal contracting with competitive entrepreneurs

This study explores dynamic contracting in venture capital investment, where entrepreneurial compensation integrates absolute and relative performance. We identify a paradox in investment strategies based on startup efficiency: fixed capital suits efficient startups, while dynamic investment benefits inefficient ones. If the Venture Capitalist (VC) can switch strategies, starting with dynamic early-stage investment and transitioning to fixed allocation would enhance returns. We also examine the trade-off between equity and competition incentives, showing that competition incentives strengthen under high correlation and uncertainty, diverging from standard agency theory. These insights help balance effort, incentives and optimize VC financing strategies.

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来源期刊

Finance Research Letters BUSINESS, FINANCE-

CiteScore

11.10

自引率

14.40%

发文量

863

期刊介绍： Finance Research Letters welcomes submissions across all areas of finance, aiming for rapid publication of significant new findings. The journal particularly encourages papers that provide insight into the replicability of established results, examine the cross-national applicability of previous findings, challenge existing methodologies, or demonstrate methodological contingencies. Papers are invited in the following areas: Actuarial studies Alternative investments Asset Pricing Bankruptcy and liquidation Banks and other Depository Institutions Behavioral and experimental finance Bibliometric and Scientometric studies of finance Capital budgeting and corporate investment Capital markets and accounting Capital structure and payout policy Commodities Contagion, crises and interdependence Corporate governance Credit and fixed income markets and instruments Derivatives Emerging markets Energy Finance and Energy Markets Financial Econometrics Financial History Financial intermediation and money markets Financial markets and marketplaces Financial Mathematics and Econophysics Financial Regulation and Law Forecasting Frontier market studies International Finance Market efficiency, event studies Mergers, acquisitions and the market for corporate control Micro Finance Institutions Microstructure Non-bank Financial Institutions Personal Finance Portfolio choice and investing Real estate finance and investing Risk SME, Family and Entrepreneurial Finance