Dm 2: dapp的决策市场

IF 4 3区 计算机科学 Q1 COMPUTER SCIENCE, HARDWARE & ARCHITECTURE
Jialiang Fan , Qianhong Wu , Qin Wang , Kun Wang , Xiaopeng Dai
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引用次数: 0

摘要

有效的治理对于复杂bb0系统的正常运行和发展至关重要。传统的区块链治理机制主要依赖于投票,面临着包括多数投票错误和激励错配在内的重大挑战。为了解决这些问题,我们提出了Dm 2,这是一个决策市场,旨在激励决策者并提高区块链治理中的决策准确性。在模型2中,参与者被鼓励进行信息交易,有效地解决了激励机制的缺陷。我们的市场可以利用集体智慧做出决定,即使大多数人的意见可能是错误的。我们结合了加密技术,包括同态时间锁谜题和零知识证明,以确保公平和安全,防止操纵并确保适当的参与者奖励。通过正式的机制设计模型,我们证明了Dm 2满足贝叶斯激励相容和预算平衡,促进了真实报告和有效的市场运行。我们对Dm 2的实现和评估显示了它在实际环境中的效率、可扩展性和实用性。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Dm 2: Decision-making market for DApps
Effective governance is vital for the proper operation and evolution of complex blockchain systems. Traditional blockchain governance mechanisms, primarily reliant on voting, face significant challenges including majority voting errors and incentive mismatch. To address these issues, we proposed Dm 2, a decision market designed to incentivize decision-makers and enhance decision accuracy in blockchain governance.
In Dm 2 participants are encouraged to trade information, effectively resolving incentive shortcomings. Our marketplace can leverage collective intelligence to make decisions even when the majority opinion may be incorrect. We incorporate cryptographic techniques, including homomorphic time-lock puzzles and zero-knowledge proofs, to ensure fairness and security, preventing manipulation and ensuring proper participant rewards. Through a formal mechanism design model, we demonstrate that Dm 2 satisfies Bayesian incentive compatibility and budget balance, promoting truthful reporting and efficient market operation. Our implementation and evaluation of Dm 2 show its efficiency, scalability, and practicality in real-world settings.
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来源期刊
Computers & Electrical Engineering
Computers & Electrical Engineering 工程技术-工程:电子与电气
CiteScore
9.20
自引率
7.00%
发文量
661
审稿时长
47 days
期刊介绍: The impact of computers has nowhere been more revolutionary than in electrical engineering. The design, analysis, and operation of electrical and electronic systems are now dominated by computers, a transformation that has been motivated by the natural ease of interface between computers and electrical systems, and the promise of spectacular improvements in speed and efficiency. Published since 1973, Computers & Electrical Engineering provides rapid publication of topical research into the integration of computer technology and computational techniques with electrical and electronic systems. The journal publishes papers featuring novel implementations of computers and computational techniques in areas like signal and image processing, high-performance computing, parallel processing, and communications. Special attention will be paid to papers describing innovative architectures, algorithms, and software tools.
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