{"title":"纵向差异化双头垄断中具有战略企业社会责任的技术许可","authors":"Dongdong Li, Wenyao Lin, Chenxuan Shang","doi":"10.1111/ajes.12620","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"<div>\n \n <p>In this paper, we study the impact of strategic corporate social responsibility (CSR) activities on the optimal licensing strategy for cost-reducing technology in a vertically differentiated duopoly. We compare three types of licensing strategies—fixed fee, royalty, and two-part tariff—under three CSR strategy structures: ST model (only firm 1 adopts a CSR strategy), TS model (only firm 2 adopts a CSR strategy), and SS model (both firms adopt CSR strategies). The results show that the licensor prefers fixed-fee licensing when it adopts a CSR strategy (i.e., ST and SS) but opts for two-part tariff licensing when it does not (i.e., TS). We also find that the optimal licensing contract leads to higher social welfare under the CSR compliance strategy than under the mixed CSR strategy. Finally, we show that firms endogenously choose the CSR compliance strategy.</p>\n </div>","PeriodicalId":47133,"journal":{"name":"American Journal of Economics and Sociology","volume":"84 3","pages":"547-566"},"PeriodicalIF":0.9000,"publicationDate":"2025-02-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Technology Licensing With Strategic Corporate Social Responsibility in a Vertically Differentiated Duopoly\",\"authors\":\"Dongdong Li, Wenyao Lin, Chenxuan Shang\",\"doi\":\"10.1111/ajes.12620\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"<div>\\n \\n <p>In this paper, we study the impact of strategic corporate social responsibility (CSR) activities on the optimal licensing strategy for cost-reducing technology in a vertically differentiated duopoly. We compare three types of licensing strategies—fixed fee, royalty, and two-part tariff—under three CSR strategy structures: ST model (only firm 1 adopts a CSR strategy), TS model (only firm 2 adopts a CSR strategy), and SS model (both firms adopt CSR strategies). The results show that the licensor prefers fixed-fee licensing when it adopts a CSR strategy (i.e., ST and SS) but opts for two-part tariff licensing when it does not (i.e., TS). We also find that the optimal licensing contract leads to higher social welfare under the CSR compliance strategy than under the mixed CSR strategy. Finally, we show that firms endogenously choose the CSR compliance strategy.</p>\\n </div>\",\"PeriodicalId\":47133,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"American Journal of Economics and Sociology\",\"volume\":\"84 3\",\"pages\":\"547-566\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.9000,\"publicationDate\":\"2025-02-26\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"0\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"American Journal of Economics and Sociology\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"96\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/ajes.12620\",\"RegionNum\":4,\"RegionCategory\":\"经济学\",\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"Q3\",\"JCRName\":\"ECONOMICS\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"American Journal of Economics and Sociology","FirstCategoryId":"96","ListUrlMain":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/ajes.12620","RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q3","JCRName":"ECONOMICS","Score":null,"Total":0}
Technology Licensing With Strategic Corporate Social Responsibility in a Vertically Differentiated Duopoly
In this paper, we study the impact of strategic corporate social responsibility (CSR) activities on the optimal licensing strategy for cost-reducing technology in a vertically differentiated duopoly. We compare three types of licensing strategies—fixed fee, royalty, and two-part tariff—under three CSR strategy structures: ST model (only firm 1 adopts a CSR strategy), TS model (only firm 2 adopts a CSR strategy), and SS model (both firms adopt CSR strategies). The results show that the licensor prefers fixed-fee licensing when it adopts a CSR strategy (i.e., ST and SS) but opts for two-part tariff licensing when it does not (i.e., TS). We also find that the optimal licensing contract leads to higher social welfare under the CSR compliance strategy than under the mixed CSR strategy. Finally, we show that firms endogenously choose the CSR compliance strategy.
期刊介绍:
The American Journal of Economics and Sociology (AJES) was founded in 1941, with support from the Robert Schalkenbach Foundation, to encourage the development of transdisciplinary solutions to social problems. In the introduction to the first issue, John Dewey observed that “the hostile state of the world and the intellectual division that has been built up in so-called ‘social science,’ are … reflections and expressions of the same fundamental causes.” Dewey commended this journal for its intention to promote “synthesis in the social field.” Dewey wrote those words almost six decades after the social science associations split off from the American Historical Association in pursuit of value-free knowledge derived from specialized disciplines. Since he wrote them, academic or disciplinary specialization has become even more pronounced. Multi-disciplinary work is superficially extolled in major universities, but practices and incentives still favor highly specialized work. The result is that academia has become a bastion of analytic excellence, breaking phenomena into components for intensive investigation, but it contributes little synthetic or holistic understanding that can aid society in finding solutions to contemporary problems. Analytic work remains important, but in response to the current lop-sided emphasis on specialization, the board of AJES has decided to return to its roots by emphasizing a more integrated and practical approach to knowledge.