基于股权的薪酬和股票回购的时机:公司日历的作用

IF 0.4 Q4 ECONOMICS
Ingolf Dittmann, Amy Yazhu Li, Stefan Obernberger, Jiaqi (Jacky) Zheng
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引用次数: 0

摘要

我们检查ceo是否使用股票回购以虚高的价格出售他们的股权。我们的研究表明,股票回购和基于股权的薪酬一样,受到公司日历的影响——公司公布收益的时间表和内幕交易限制。公司日历可以充分解释为什么股票回购和基于股权的薪酬同时发生。在具有强大内部治理或高度外部监督的公司中,与公司日历的一致性更为严格。当首席执行官出售股票时,公司实际上不太可能回购股票。我们的发现与早期的研究相一致,并强调了公司日历对股票回购时机的重要性。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Equity-based compensation and the timing of share repurchases: the role of the corporate calendar
We examine whether CEOs use share repurchases to sell their equity at inflated prices. We document that share repurchases, like equity-based compensation, are affected by the corporate calendar—the firm's schedule of earnings announcements and insider trading restrictions. The corporate calendar can fully explain why share repurchases and equity-based compensation coincide. The alignment with the corporate calendar is stricter in firms with strong internal governance or high external monitoring. When CEOs sell equity, firms are actually less likely to repurchase. Our findings reconcile earlier studies and highlight the importance of the corporate calendar for the timing of share repurchases.
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