危机期间的制度机制、所有权和银行风险承担

IF 5.5 3区管理学 Q1 BUSINESS, FINANCE

British Accounting Review Pub Date : 2025-05-01 DOI:10.1016/j.bar.2024.101451

Thi Thuy Anh Vo , Nathan Lael Joseph

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引用次数: 0

摘要

以往的研究表明，前期投资者保护、政府/机构质量和所有权对银行在危机期间的风险承担影响很小或没有影响。利用40个国家的同期数据，我们发现在全球金融危机（GFC）和欧元区危机/主权债务危机期间，机构机制、投资者保护、银行监管和监管（BRS）规则和所有权降低了银行的风险承担。制度机制对银行风险承担的影响最大，而外资和政府所有权的影响最弱。与银行违约的距离越远，出现危机机制的可能性就越低。投资者保护增加（降低）了欧元区危机（GFC）机制的可能性。政府所有权增加（降低）了欧元区危机（GFC）机制的可能性。使用广义的二元联结函数，我们通过表明高风险会增加危机机制的可能性来解开危机机制与银行风险承担之间的关系。

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Institutional mechanisms, ownership and bank risk-taking during crises

Previous studies indicate that prior period investor protection, quality of government/institution and ownership have little to no influence on bank risk-taking around crisis periods. Using contemporaneous data for 40 countries, we show that institutional mechanisms, investor protection, bank regulation and supervision (BRS) rules, and ownership, reduced bank risk-taking around the Global Financial Crisis (GFC) and the Eurozone Crisis/Sovereign Debt Crisis periods. Institutional mechanisms have the strongest risk-reducing impacts on bank risk-taking, whereas foreign and government ownership have the weakest impacts. The greater the distance from bank default the lower the likelihood of crisis regimes. Investor protection increased (decreased) the likelihood of the GFC (Eurozone Crisis) regimes. Government ownership increased (decreased) the likelihood of the GFC (Eurozone Crisis) regimes. Using a generalized bivariate copula function, we untangle the relation between crisis regimes and bank risk-taking by showing that higher risk-taking increases the likelihood of crisis regimes.

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来源期刊

British Accounting Review BUSINESS, FINANCE-

CiteScore

8.60

自引率

3.90%

发文量

审稿时长

76 days

期刊介绍： The British Accounting Review*is pleased to publish original scholarly papers across the whole spectrum of accounting and finance. The journal is eclectic and pluralistic and contributions are welcomed across a wide range of research methodologies (e.g. analytical, archival, experimental, survey and qualitative case methods) and topics (e.g. financial accounting, management accounting, finance and financial management, auditing, public sector accounting, social and environmental accounting; accounting education and accounting history), evidence from UK and non-UK sources are equally acceptable.