{"title":"异构多智能体系统对签名有向图指数无界攻击的网络物理防御","authors":"Yichao Wang;Mohamadamin Rajabinezhad;Yi Zhang;Shan Zuo","doi":"10.1109/TNSE.2025.3545280","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"Cyber-physical systems (CPSs) are subjected to attacks on both cyber and physical spaces. In reality, attackers could launch any time-varying signals. Existing literature generally addresses bounded attack signals and/or bounded-first-order-derivative attack signals. In contrast, this paper proposes a privacy-preserving fully-distributed attack-resilient bilayer defense framework to address the bipartite output containment problem for heterogeneous multi-agent systems (MASs) on signed digraphs, in the presence of exponentially unbounded false data injection (EU-FDI) attacks on both the cyber-physical layer (CPL) and observer layer (OL). First, we design attack-resilient dynamic compensators that utilize data communicated on the OL to estimate the convex combinations of the states and negative states of the leaders. To enhance the security of transmitted data, a privacy-preserving mechanism is incorporated into the observer design. The privacy-preserving attack-resilient observers address the EU-FDI attacks on the OL and guarantee the uniformly ultimately bounded (UUB) estimation of the leaders' states in the presence of the eavesdroppers. Then, by using the observers' states, fully-distributed attack-resilient controllers are designed on the CPL to further address the EU-FDI attacks on the actuators. The theoretical soundness of the proposed bilayer resilient defense framework is proved by Lyapunov stability analysis. Finally, a comparative case study for heterogeneous MASs and the application in DC microgrids as a specific case study validate the enhanced resilience of the proposed defense strategies.","PeriodicalId":54229,"journal":{"name":"IEEE Transactions on Network Science and Engineering","volume":"12 3","pages":"2165-2179"},"PeriodicalIF":6.7000,"publicationDate":"2025-02-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Cyber-Physical Defense for Heterogeneous Multi-Agent Systems Against Exponentially Unbounded Attacks on Signed Digraphs\",\"authors\":\"Yichao Wang;Mohamadamin Rajabinezhad;Yi Zhang;Shan Zuo\",\"doi\":\"10.1109/TNSE.2025.3545280\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"Cyber-physical systems (CPSs) are subjected to attacks on both cyber and physical spaces. In reality, attackers could launch any time-varying signals. Existing literature generally addresses bounded attack signals and/or bounded-first-order-derivative attack signals. In contrast, this paper proposes a privacy-preserving fully-distributed attack-resilient bilayer defense framework to address the bipartite output containment problem for heterogeneous multi-agent systems (MASs) on signed digraphs, in the presence of exponentially unbounded false data injection (EU-FDI) attacks on both the cyber-physical layer (CPL) and observer layer (OL). First, we design attack-resilient dynamic compensators that utilize data communicated on the OL to estimate the convex combinations of the states and negative states of the leaders. To enhance the security of transmitted data, a privacy-preserving mechanism is incorporated into the observer design. The privacy-preserving attack-resilient observers address the EU-FDI attacks on the OL and guarantee the uniformly ultimately bounded (UUB) estimation of the leaders' states in the presence of the eavesdroppers. Then, by using the observers' states, fully-distributed attack-resilient controllers are designed on the CPL to further address the EU-FDI attacks on the actuators. The theoretical soundness of the proposed bilayer resilient defense framework is proved by Lyapunov stability analysis. Finally, a comparative case study for heterogeneous MASs and the application in DC microgrids as a specific case study validate the enhanced resilience of the proposed defense strategies.\",\"PeriodicalId\":54229,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"IEEE Transactions on Network Science and Engineering\",\"volume\":\"12 3\",\"pages\":\"2165-2179\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":6.7000,\"publicationDate\":\"2025-02-24\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"0\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"IEEE Transactions on Network Science and Engineering\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"94\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/10902133/\",\"RegionNum\":2,\"RegionCategory\":\"计算机科学\",\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"Q1\",\"JCRName\":\"ENGINEERING, MULTIDISCIPLINARY\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"IEEE Transactions on Network Science and Engineering","FirstCategoryId":"94","ListUrlMain":"https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/10902133/","RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"计算机科学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q1","JCRName":"ENGINEERING, MULTIDISCIPLINARY","Score":null,"Total":0}
Cyber-Physical Defense for Heterogeneous Multi-Agent Systems Against Exponentially Unbounded Attacks on Signed Digraphs
Cyber-physical systems (CPSs) are subjected to attacks on both cyber and physical spaces. In reality, attackers could launch any time-varying signals. Existing literature generally addresses bounded attack signals and/or bounded-first-order-derivative attack signals. In contrast, this paper proposes a privacy-preserving fully-distributed attack-resilient bilayer defense framework to address the bipartite output containment problem for heterogeneous multi-agent systems (MASs) on signed digraphs, in the presence of exponentially unbounded false data injection (EU-FDI) attacks on both the cyber-physical layer (CPL) and observer layer (OL). First, we design attack-resilient dynamic compensators that utilize data communicated on the OL to estimate the convex combinations of the states and negative states of the leaders. To enhance the security of transmitted data, a privacy-preserving mechanism is incorporated into the observer design. The privacy-preserving attack-resilient observers address the EU-FDI attacks on the OL and guarantee the uniformly ultimately bounded (UUB) estimation of the leaders' states in the presence of the eavesdroppers. Then, by using the observers' states, fully-distributed attack-resilient controllers are designed on the CPL to further address the EU-FDI attacks on the actuators. The theoretical soundness of the proposed bilayer resilient defense framework is proved by Lyapunov stability analysis. Finally, a comparative case study for heterogeneous MASs and the application in DC microgrids as a specific case study validate the enhanced resilience of the proposed defense strategies.
期刊介绍:
The proposed journal, called the IEEE Transactions on Network Science and Engineering (TNSE), is committed to timely publishing of peer-reviewed technical articles that deal with the theory and applications of network science and the interconnections among the elements in a system that form a network. In particular, the IEEE Transactions on Network Science and Engineering publishes articles on understanding, prediction, and control of structures and behaviors of networks at the fundamental level. The types of networks covered include physical or engineered networks, information networks, biological networks, semantic networks, economic networks, social networks, and ecological networks. Aimed at discovering common principles that govern network structures, network functionalities and behaviors of networks, the journal seeks articles on understanding, prediction, and control of structures and behaviors of networks. Another trans-disciplinary focus of the IEEE Transactions on Network Science and Engineering is the interactions between and co-evolution of different genres of networks.