p2p借贷：定价机制的转变和风险敏感性的变化

IF 3.6 2区经济学 Q1 BUSINESS, FINANCE

Journal of Banking & Finance Pub Date : 2025-04-09 DOI:10.1016/j.jbankfin.2025.107459

Jiakai Chen , Wei Huang , Xinruo Wang

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引用次数: 0

摘要

我们调查了在普洛斯彼尔网站的定价机制从拍卖到张贴价格的转变后，利率的风险敏感性的变化。我们发现，这种转变导致贷款定价对信用风险的敏感性降低。此外，这一变化导致平台的利润增加，而投资者承担的信用风险得到的补偿减少。此外，借款人遇到的信贷配给减少了。对两种定价机制下的重复借款人的分析，以及Prosper升级后公布价格下的数据测试，证实了这些发现。我们认为，较低的基于风险的定价源于借贷平台的激励。

本文章由计算机程序翻译，如有差异，请以英文原文为准。

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Peer-to-peer lending: Shift of pricing regime and changes in risk sensitivity

We investigate the changes in risk sensitivities of interest rates following a shift in Prosper.com's pricing mechanism from auctions to posted prices. We find that the shift leads to reduced sensitivities of loan pricing to credit risk. Furthermore, this change results in higher profits for the platform while investors receive less compensation for the credit risk they undertake. Additionally, borrowers encounter less credit rationing. Analyses of repeat borrowers under both pricing regimes and tests with data under Prosper's upgraded posted prices confirm these findings. We argue that less risk-based pricing results from the incentives of the lending platform.

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来源期刊

Journal of Banking & Finance Multiple-

CiteScore

6.40

自引率

5.40%

发文量

262

期刊介绍： The Journal of Banking and Finance (JBF) publishes theoretical and empirical research papers spanning all the major research fields in finance and banking. The aim of the Journal of Banking and Finance is to provide an outlet for the increasing flow of scholarly research concerning financial institutions and the money and capital markets within which they function. The Journal''s emphasis is on theoretical developments and their implementation, empirical, applied, and policy-oriented research in banking and other domestic and international financial institutions and markets. The Journal''s purpose is to improve communications between, and within, the academic and other research communities and policymakers and operational decision makers at financial institutions - private and public, national and international, and their regulators. The Journal is one of the largest Finance journals, with approximately 1500 new submissions per year, mainly in the following areas: Asset Management; Asset Pricing; Banking (Efficiency, Regulation, Risk Management, Solvency); Behavioural Finance; Capital Structure; Corporate Finance; Corporate Governance; Derivative Pricing and Hedging; Distribution Forecasting with Financial Applications; Entrepreneurial Finance; Empirical Finance; Financial Economics; Financial Markets (Alternative, Bonds, Currency, Commodity, Derivatives, Equity, Energy, Real Estate); FinTech; Fund Management; General Equilibrium Models; High-Frequency Trading; Intermediation; International Finance; Hedge Funds; Investments; Liquidity; Market Efficiency; Market Microstructure; Mergers and Acquisitions; Networks; Performance Analysis; Political Risk; Portfolio Optimization; Regulation of Financial Markets and Institutions; Risk Management and Analysis; Systemic Risk; Term Structure Models; Venture Capital.