向客户收费:可支付的安全计算及其应用

IF 6.3 1区 计算机科学 Q1 COMPUTER SCIENCE, THEORY & METHODS
Cong Zhang;Liqiang Peng;Weiran Liu;Shuaishuai Li;Meng Hao;Lei Zhang;Dongdai Lin
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引用次数: 0

摘要

在线领域见证了数据买卖的激增,促使专门的数据市场出现。这些平台迎合服务器(卖家),使他们能够为访问他们的数据设定价格,并使客户(买家)随后可以购买这些数据,从而简化和促进此类交易。然而,目前的数据市场主要面临以下几个问题。首先,它们未能保护客户端的隐私,因为它们假定客户端以明文形式提交查询。其次,这些模型容易受到恶意客户行为的影响,例如,使客户有可能从事套利活动。为了解决上述问题,我们提出了支付安全计算,这是一种专门为数据定价场景设计的新型安全计算范式。它使服务器能够安全地获取必要的定价信息,同时保护客户端查询的隐私。此外,它还加强了服务器的隐私,防止潜在的恶意客户端活动。作为具体的应用,我们为两种不同的安全计算场景设计了定制的可支付协议:关键字私有信息检索(KPIR)和私有集交集(PSI)。我们实施我们的两个应付协议,并将它们与不支持定价作为基准的最先进的相关协议进行比较。由于我们的支付协议在数据定价设置中更强大,实验结果表明它们不会在基线协议上引入太多开销。我们的应付kpi达到与基线相同的在线成本,而设置速度比它慢1.3-1.6美元。我们的可支付PSI需要比基准协议多2倍的通信成本,而运行时间则比基准协议慢1.5-3.2倍,具体取决于网络设置。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Charge Your Clients: Payable Secure Computation and Its Applications
The online realm has witnessed a surge in the buying and selling of data, prompting the emergence of dedicated data marketplaces. These platforms cater to servers (sellers), enabling them to set prices for access to their data, and clients (buyers), who can subsequently purchase these data, thereby streamlining and facilitating such transactions. However, the current data market is primarily confronted with the following issues. Firstly, they fail to protect client privacy, presupposing that clients submit their queries in plaintext. Secondly, these models are susceptible to being impacted by malicious client behavior, for example, enabling clients to potentially engage in arbitrage activities. To address the aforementioned issues, we propose payable secure computation, a novel secure computation paradigm specifically designed for data pricing scenarios. It grants the server the ability to securely procure essential pricing information while protecting the privacy of client queries. Additionally, it fortifies the server’s privacy against potential malicious client activities. As specific applications, we have devised customized payable protocols for two distinct secure computation scenarios: Keyword Private Information Retrieval (KPIR) and Private Set Intersection (PSI). We implement our two payable protocols and compare them with the state-of-the-art related protocols that do not support pricing as a baseline. Since our payable protocols are more powerful in the data pricing setting, the experiment results show that they do not introduce much overhead over the baseline protocols. Our payable KPIR achieves the same online cost as baseline, while the setup is about $1.3-1.6\times $ slower than it. Our payable PSI needs about $2\times $ more communication cost than that of baseline protocol, while the runtime is $1.5-3.2\times $ slower than it depending on the network setting.
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来源期刊
IEEE Transactions on Information Forensics and Security
IEEE Transactions on Information Forensics and Security 工程技术-工程:电子与电气
CiteScore
14.40
自引率
7.40%
发文量
234
审稿时长
6.5 months
期刊介绍: The IEEE Transactions on Information Forensics and Security covers the sciences, technologies, and applications relating to information forensics, information security, biometrics, surveillance and systems applications that incorporate these features
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