IF 4.4 2区 计算机科学 Q1 COMPUTER SCIENCE, HARDWARE & ARCHITECTURE
Runqun Xiong , Jing Cheng , Jiahang Pu , Xirui Dong , Ciyuan Chen , Zhuqing Xu
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引用次数: 0

摘要

由于特定行业区块链的孤立性以及异构网络之间缺乏信任机制,物联网(IoT)中的跨链数据共享已成为一项严峻挑战。这个问题尤为重要,因为物联网数据共享可以实现跨行业合作,释放数据价值,促进智慧城市和智能交通等应用领域的创新。现有的解决方案,包括公证机制、侧链和中继链,往往存在集中化问题、可扩展性有限或对积极参与的激励不足等问题,因此不足以满足物联网生态系统的动态和大规模需求。为解决这一问题,本文提出了一种基于信誉的跨链数据共享激励机制,它将主链-子链架构与基于进化博弈论的两阶段公证组选举算法相结合。此外,本文还采用斯塔克尔伯格博弈来模拟数据生产者和消费者之间的互动,优化数据定价策略,激励可信共享。通过在星形拓扑区块链网络上进行大量模拟,对所提出的框架进行了评估,测试了其可扩展性、公平性和有效性。结果表明,该机制不仅缓解了中心化问题,还增强了异构区块链之间的信任、协作和效率,为物联网数据共享应用奠定了坚实的基础。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Enhancing trust and collaboration: A reputation-driven mechanism for cross-chain IoT data sharing
Cross-chain data sharing in the Internet of Things (IoT) has become a critical challenge due to the isolation of industry-specific blockchains and the lack of trust mechanisms between heterogeneous networks. This issue is particularly important as IoT data sharing enables cross-industry collaboration, unlocks data value, and fosters innovation in applications such as smart cities and intelligent transportation. Existing solutions, including notary mechanisms, side-chains, and relay chains, often suffer from centralization issues, limited scalability, or inadequate incentives for active participation, making them insufficient to address the dynamic and large-scale requirements of IoT ecosystems. To tackle this problem, this paper proposes a reputation-based incentive mechanism for cross-chain data sharing, which integrates a main-subchain architecture with a two-stage notary group election algorithm based on evolutionary game theory. Additionally, a Stackelberg game is employed to model interactions between data producers and consumers, optimizing data pricing strategies and incentivizing trustworthy sharing. The proposed framework is evaluated through extensive simulations on a star-topology blockchain network, testing its scalability, fairness, and effectiveness. Results demonstrate that the mechanism not only mitigates centralization problems but also enhances trust, collaboration, and efficiency across heterogeneous blockchains, providing a robust foundation for IoT data-sharing applications.
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来源期刊
Computer Networks
Computer Networks 工程技术-电信学
CiteScore
10.80
自引率
3.60%
发文量
434
审稿时长
8.6 months
期刊介绍: Computer Networks is an international, archival journal providing a publication vehicle for complete coverage of all topics of interest to those involved in the computer communications networking area. The audience includes researchers, managers and operators of networks as well as designers and implementors. The Editorial Board will consider any material for publication that is of interest to those groups.
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