Physical-Layer Security in AmBC-NOMA Networks With Random Eavesdroppers

In this work, we investigate the physical-layer security (PLS) of ambient backscatter communication nonorthogonal multiple access (AmBC-NOMA) networks where noncolluding eavesdroppers (Eves) are randomly distributed. In the proposed system, a base station (BS) transmits a superimposed signal to a typical NOMA user pair, while a backscatter device (BD) simultaneously transmits its unique signal by reflecting and modulating the BS’s signal. Meanwhile, Eves passively attempt to wiretap the ongoing transmissions. Notably, the number and locations of Eves are unknown, posing a substantial security threat to the system. To address this challenge, the BS injects artificial noise (AN) to mislead the Eves, and a protected zone is employed to create an Eve-exclusion area around the BS. Theoretical expressions for outage probability (OP) and intercept probability (IP) are provided to evaluate the system’s reliability-security tradeoff. Asymptotic behavior at high signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) is further explored, including the derivation of diversity orders for the OP. Numerical results validate the analytical findings through extensive simulations, demonstrating that both the AN injection and protected zone can effectively enhance PLS. Furthermore, analysis and insights of different key parameters, including transmit SNR, reflection efficiency at the BD, power allocation coefficient, power fraction allocated to desired signal, Eve-exclusion area radius, Eve distribution density, and backscattered AN cancellation efficiency, on OP and IP are also provided.