An experimental evaluation of TEE technology: Benchmarking transparent approaches based on SGX, SEV, and TDX

Protection of data-in-use is a key priority, for which Trusted Execution Environment (TEE) technology has unarguably emerged as a — possibly the most — promising solution. Multiple server-side TEE offerings have been released over the years, exhibiting substantial differences with respect to several aspects. The first comer was Intel SGX, which featured Process-based TEE protection, an efficient yet difficult to use approach. Some SGX limitations were (partially) overcome by runtimes, notably: Gramine, Scone, and Occlum. A major paradigm shift was later brought by AMD SEV, with VM-based TEE protection, which enabled ”lift-and-shift” deployment of legacy applications. This new paradigm has been implemented by Intel only recently, in TDX. While the threat model of the aforementioned TEE solutions has been widely discussed, a thorough performance comparison is still lacking in the literature. This paper provides a comparative evaluation of TDX, SEV, Gramine-SGX, and Occlum-SGX. We study computational overhead and resource usage, under different operational scenarios and using a diverse suite of legacy applications. By doing so, we provide a reliable performance assessment under realistic conditions. We explicitly emphasize that — at the time of writing — TDX was recently released to the public. Thus, the evaluation of TDX is a unique feature of this study.