制造商开发市场渠道的电子零售平台或批发策略

IF 6.7 1区 工程技术 Q1 COMPUTER SCIENCE, INTERDISCIPLINARY APPLICATIONS
Heng Du
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引用次数: 0

摘要

与传统的批发模式相比,电子零售平台已成为制造商建立市场渠道的重要选择。在观察的启发下,本文采用数学优化和博弈论的方法建立了两个模型来研究制造商的电子零售平台和批发策略。我们首先关注上游制造商是否进入电子零售平台的问题。对比了两种情况下制造商的决策和利润。接下来,考虑由第三方物流提供商、制造商和电子商务平台组成的供应链。我们进一步探讨第三方物流和渠道力量如何影响制造商的战略动机。研究了批发战略、制造商主导的电子商务战略和第三方主导的电子商务战略。研究发现:(1)即使网络平台收费较高,制造商仍应坚持电子零售策略;(ii)如果制造商的物流服务由第三方提供,平台收费和物流服务成本同时影响制造商的战略选择动机;(三)在电子零售环境下,如果平台费用不高,制造商应该利用自己的渠道力量来获取更多的渠道利润;否则,厂商就应该放弃渠道影响力优势。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
E-retail platform or wholesale strategy for a manufacturer developing a market channel
Compared with the conventional wholesale mode, the e-retail platform has been regarded as an important alternative for a manufacturer building a market channel. Motivated by the observation, this paper develops two models to investigate a manufacturer’s e-retail platform and wholesale strategies by the methods of mathematics optimization and game theory. We first focus on the issue of whether to enter an e-retail platform for an upstream manufacturer. The manufacturer’s decisions and profits under two scenarios are contrasted. Next, a supply chain with a third party logistics provider, a manufacturer and an e-commerce platform is considered. We further explore how a third party logistics and channel power affect the manufacturer’s strategy motivation. Three strategies are examined including the wholesale strategy, the manufacturer-led e-commerce strategy, and the e-commerce strategy led by the third party. It is found that: (i) even though the online platform charge is large, the manufacturer should still insist on the e-retail strategy; (ii) if the manufacturer’s logistics service is provided by a third party, the platform charge and the logistics service cost simultaneously affect the manufacturer’s strategy choice motivation; (iii) in the e-retail environment, the manufacturer should utilize his own channel power to extract more channel profits if the platform fee is not large; otherwise, the manufacturer should give up the channel influence advantage.
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来源期刊
Computers & Industrial Engineering
Computers & Industrial Engineering 工程技术-工程:工业
CiteScore
12.70
自引率
12.70%
发文量
794
审稿时长
10.6 months
期刊介绍: Computers & Industrial Engineering (CAIE) is dedicated to researchers, educators, and practitioners in industrial engineering and related fields. Pioneering the integration of computers in research, education, and practice, industrial engineering has evolved to make computers and electronic communication integral to its domain. CAIE publishes original contributions focusing on the development of novel computerized methodologies to address industrial engineering problems. It also highlights the applications of these methodologies to issues within the broader industrial engineering and associated communities. The journal actively encourages submissions that push the boundaries of fundamental theories and concepts in industrial engineering techniques.
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