犯罪伙伴:促进针对联邦学习的定向投毒攻击

IF 6.3 1区 计算机科学 Q1 COMPUTER SCIENCE, THEORY & METHODS
Shihua Sun;Shridatt Sugrim;Angelos Stavrou;Haining Wang
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引用次数: 0

摘要

联邦学习(FL)暴露了针对性中毒攻击的漏洞,这种攻击的目的是导致错误分类,特别是从源类到目标类。然而,使用完善的防御框架,这些攻击的毒害影响可以大大减轻。我们介绍了一种通用的预训练阶段方法来增强针对FL的针对性中毒攻击,称为BoTPA。它的设计原理是利用所有数据点的模型更新贡献,包括源和目标类之外的数据点,来构建一个放大器集,在这个放大器集中,我们在FL训练过程之前伪造数据标签,作为增强攻击的手段。我们全面评估了BoTPA在各种针对性投毒攻击中的有效性和兼容性。在数据中毒攻击下,我们的评估显示,与基线相比,BoTPA可以在所有可能的源-目标类别组合中实现攻击成功率(RI-ASR)的中位数相对增长(15.3%至36.9%),恶意客户端百分比不同。在模型中毒的情况下,BoTPA在克鲁姆和多克鲁姆防御下的ri - asr范围从13.3%到94.7%,在中位数防御下从2.6%到49.2%,在火焰防御下从2.9%到63.5%。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Partner in Crime: Boosting Targeted Poisoning Attacks Against Federated Learning
Federated Learning (FL) exposes vulnerabilities to targeted poisoning attacks that aim to cause misclassification specifically from the source class to the target class. However, using well-established defense frameworks, the poisoning impact of these attacks can be greatly mitigated. We introduce a generalized pre-training stage approach to Boost Targeted Poisoning Attacks against FL, called BoTPA. Its design rationale is to leverage the model update contributions of all data points, including ones outside of the source and target classes, to construct an Amplifier set, in which we falsify the data labels before the FL training process, as a means to boost attacks. We comprehensively evaluate the effectiveness and compatibility of BoTPA on various targeted poisoning attacks. Under data poisoning attacks, our evaluations reveal that BoTPA can achieve a median Relative Increase in Attack Success Rate (RI-ASR) between 15.3% and 36.9% across all possible source-target class combinations, with varying percentages of malicious clients, compared to its baseline. In the context of model poisoning, BoTPA attains RI-ASRs ranging from 13.3% to 94.7% in the presence of the Krum and Multi-Krum defenses, from 2.6% to 49.2% under the Median defense, and from 2.9% to 63.5% under the Flame defense.
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来源期刊
IEEE Transactions on Information Forensics and Security
IEEE Transactions on Information Forensics and Security 工程技术-工程:电子与电气
CiteScore
14.40
自引率
7.40%
发文量
234
审稿时长
6.5 months
期刊介绍: The IEEE Transactions on Information Forensics and Security covers the sciences, technologies, and applications relating to information forensics, information security, biometrics, surveillance and systems applications that incorporate these features
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