IF 1.7 4区 经济学 Q2 ECONOMICS
William C. Boning, Joel Slemrod, Ellen Stuart, Alex Turk
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引用次数: 0

摘要

本文利用国税局税收官员对税务债务人案件的准随机分配作为工具变量,来确定暂停收债对纳税遵从度和未来收入的因果效应。与未使用工具变量的估计结果不同,我们没有发现具有统计学意义的证据表明,暂缓收债会降低未来纳税义务的遵从度或未来报告的收入。在边际困难案例中,暂停追债反而会增加未来收入,特别是纳税人配偶的工资收入。此外,我们还解决了对税务官员可能存在的非随机分配的担忧。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Does giving tax debtors a break improve compliance and income? Evidence from quasi-random assignment of IRS Revenue Officers

This paper uses the quasi-random assignment of IRS Revenue Officers to tax debtors' cases as an instrumental variable to identify the causal effects of suspending debt collection on tax compliance and future income. In contrast to uninstrumented estimates, we find no statistically significant evidence that putting off attempts to collect debt reduces compliance with future tax obligations or future reported income. Among marginal hardship cases, pausing collection instead increases future income, specifically wage earnings by the taxpayer's spouse. In addition, we address concerns about potential non-random assignment of Revenue Officers.

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来源期刊
Economic Inquiry
Economic Inquiry ECONOMICS-
CiteScore
3.80
自引率
5.60%
发文量
63
期刊介绍: Published since 1962, (formerly Western Economic Journal), EI is widely regarded as one of the top scholarly journals in its field. Besides containing research on all economics topic areas, a principal objective is to make each article understandable to economists who are not necessarily specialists in the article topic area. Nine Nobel laureates are among EI long list of prestigious authors.
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