中介机构对保险需求和定价的影响

IF 2.2 2区经济学 Q2 ECONOMICS

Insurance Mathematics & Economics Pub Date : 2025-03-05 DOI:10.1016/j.insmatheco.2025.03.002

Dongchen Li , Yan Zeng , Yixing Zhao

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引用次数: 0

摘要

我们研究了独立保险中介对保险需求和定价的影响。中介人对没有经验的保险买家负有信义责任，并采用两种报酬制度：咨询收费制度和佣金制度。买方（通过中介）与保险人之间的保险契约被表述为一个Stackelberg保险博弈。我们的分析得到了买方均衡赔偿和保险人均衡保费负担的封闭表达式。随后，我们探讨了受托责任和报酬安排对均衡策略和利益相关者福利的影响，揭示了几个经济含义。我们发现，高保费的过度保险现象是信义义务恶化的结果。此外，我们的结果指出中介和保险公司之间存在潜在的默契勾结。此外，我们观察到利益相关者对市场上最受青睐的薪酬制度没有达成共识。

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The impact of intermediaries on insurance demand and pricing

We study the impact of an independent insurance intermediary on insurance demand and pricing. The intermediary holds a fiduciary duty to an unsophisticated insurance buyer and adopts two remuneration systems: a fee-for-advice system and a commission system. Insurance contracting between the buyer (via the intermediary) and the insurer is formulated as a Stackelberg insurance game. Our analysis yields closed-form expressions for the buyer's equilibrium indemnity and the insurer's equilibrium premium loading. Subsequently, we explore the effects of fiduciary duty and remuneration arrangements on equilibrium strategies and stakeholder welfare, unraveling several economic implications. We find that the phenomenon of over-insuring at high premiums attributes to the deterioration of fiduciary duty. Additionally, our results point to the potential presence of tacit collusion between the intermediary and insurer. Moreover, we observe that there is no consensus among stakeholders regarding the most favored remuneration system in the market.

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来源期刊

Insurance Mathematics & Economics 管理科学-数学跨学科应用

CiteScore

3.40

自引率

15.80%

发文量

审稿时长

17.3 weeks

期刊介绍： Insurance: Mathematics and Economics publishes leading research spanning all fields of actuarial science research. It appears six times per year and is the largest journal in actuarial science research around the world. Insurance: Mathematics and Economics is an international academic journal that aims to strengthen the communication between individuals and groups who develop and apply research results in actuarial science. The journal feels a particular obligation to facilitate closer cooperation between those who conduct research in insurance mathematics and quantitative insurance economics, and practicing actuaries who are interested in the implementation of the results. To this purpose, Insurance: Mathematics and Economics publishes high-quality articles of broad international interest, concerned with either the theory of insurance mathematics and quantitative insurance economics or the inventive application of it, including empirical or experimental results. Articles that combine several of these aspects are particularly considered.