Detection and localization of dynamic load altering attacks in power systems

Cyber-attacks in power systems which are a type of cyber-physical systems (CPSs) can cause many problems, including system instability and blackouts. Meanwhile, dynamic load altering attacks (D-LAAs) could have a very destructive effect. In this paper, detection of the d-LAA in the power systems is discussed. The power system in presence of the d-LAA is modeled as a singular system and then an appropriate attack detection observer is designed. Then, using a bank of unknown input observers, the location of the attack is determined. Comparing to the existing results, no restrictive assumption such as presence of phasor measurement units (PMUs) in all buses or on the attack signal are considered. The design is done in the discrete-time domain and thus is suitable for practical implementation in the power systems where most of the relays and equipment are numerical. The design of the ADO and attack localization observers (ALOs) are performed using a centralized approach which facilitates taking the necessary actions to maintain the stability of the power system. Finally, simulation results on the IEEE 39-bus system with the help of MATLAB show the efficiency and capability of the proposed method.