保护保护者:合规领域的举报和报复

IF 1.3 3区 社会学 Q3 BUSINESS
Jeffrey R. Boles, Leora F. Eisenstadt, Jennifer M. Pacella
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引用次数: 0

摘要

在过去的十年里,我们了解到一些世界上最大的公司发生了大规模的丑闻。在这些案例中,合规官员负责确保公司遵守法律和监管要求以及他们自己的内部行为准则,然而,这些公司并没有受到他们自己的坏人的保护。合规职能的重要性日益增加,与此同时,为合规角色雇用和保留合格人员变得越来越困难。我们认为,合规人员面临的一个关键问题是,当合规人员向组织内部的上级举报非法或不可接受的行为时,法律未能保护他们免受报复,这一问题可以通过立法的关注得到改善。从本质上讲,当合规官员履行职责并提醒公司可能存在的违法行为,或对公司对潜在违法行为的处理提出质疑时,这些官员很容易受到报复,可能会被解雇、降职等,而不会产生法律后果。那些组织雇佣来保护他们的员工本身也没有受到保护。在本文中,我们从三个方面考虑合规官员:平等就业机会(EEO)、证券欺诈和金融监管以及反洗钱。在三个领域中的两个领域,我们发现合规官员特别容易受到合法报复,而第三个领域提供了一个保护性强得多的环境,并为其他两个领域提供了前进的道路。在平等就业机会领域和证券欺诈领域,我们强调普通法理论和法定解释造成了合规官员的这种情况。相比之下,《2020年反洗钱法》(AMLA)为该领域的举报人合规官员提供了特殊保护,因此,我们建议将AMLA作为其他两个领域拟议变更的示范立法。法院有意无意地缩小了对合规官员举报人的保护范围,而没有考虑举报人行为的更广泛影响,这让举报人的困境变得更加复杂。我们建议国会对这些狭隘的教条做出回应,以便合规官员能够有效地完成他们的工作,保护他们的组织免受法律责任和丑闻的侵害,并确保他们在履行这一重要职能时免受报复。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Protecting the protectors: Whistleblowing and retaliation in the compliance arena

In the last decade, we learned of massive scandals at some of the world's largest companies. In each of those cases, compliance officers were charged with ensuring that the company adhered to legal and regulatory requirements and their own internal codes of conduct, and yet, these companies were not protected from their own bad actors. Compliance functions have grown in importance, while, at the same time, it has become increasingly difficult to hire and retain qualified personnel for compliance roles. We posit that a key issue facing compliance personnel—one that could be improved with legislative attention—is the failure of the law to protect compliance officers from retaliation when they blow the whistle by reporting unlawful or unacceptable conduct to superiors inside the organization. In essence, when compliance officers do their jobs and alert the company to possible violations of law or take issue with the company's handling of a potential legal violation, these officers are vulnerable to retaliation and can be terminated, demoted, and the like without legal consequence. The very employees that organizations hire to protect them are themselves unprotected. In this article, we consider compliance officers in three areas: Equal Employment Opportunity (EEO), securities fraud and financial regulation, and anti-money laundering. In two out of the three areas, we find compliance officers uniquely exposed to lawful retaliation, while the third area provides a far more protective environment and offers a path forward for the other two. In both the EEO sector and the securities fraud sector, we highlight the common law doctrines and statutory interpretations that have created this situation for compliance officers. In contrast, the Anti-Money Laundering Act of 2020 (AMLA) provides exceptional protection for whistleblower compliance officers in this sector, and as a result, we propose using the AMLA as model legislation for proposed changes in the other two domains. The plight of compliance officer whistleblowers is complicated by courts that have intentionally and unintentionally narrowed protections without contemplating the broader implications of their actions. We propose that Congress respond to these narrowing doctrines so that compliance officers can effectively do their jobs and protect their organizations from legal liability and scandals, with the assurance of protection against retaliation as they perform this essential function.

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来源期刊
CiteScore
1.10
自引率
16.70%
发文量
17
期刊介绍: The ABLJ is a faculty-edited, double blind peer reviewed journal, continuously published since 1963. Our mission is to publish only top quality law review articles that make a scholarly contribution to all areas of law that impact business theory and practice. We search for those articles that articulate a novel research question and make a meaningful contribution directly relevant to scholars and practitioners of business law. The blind peer review process means legal scholars well-versed in the relevant specialty area have determined selected articles are original, thorough, important, and timely. Faculty editors assure the authors’ contribution to scholarship is evident. We aim to elevate legal scholarship and inform responsible business decisions.
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