考虑投资组合风险的最优委托契约

IF 3.6 2区 经济学 Q1 BUSINESS, FINANCE
Jiliang Sheng , Yanyan Yang , Jun Yang
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引用次数: 0

摘要

传统的线性基准合约往往会导致与基准的过度挂钩,从而导致基准股票的价格扭曲。本文研究了存在委托代理摩擦时的最优委托契约。具体而言,本文探讨了将投资组合风险纳入契约对委托人和代理人的最优策略以及均衡资产价格的影响。当代理摩擦严重时,最优契约为投资组合风险提供奖励以提高风险分担,为指数回报提供补偿以推动代理偏离钉住指数。在均衡状态下,委托人进行指数投资,代理人只投资单项风险资产,减轻了代理摩擦引起的价格扭曲。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Optimal delegation contract with portfolio risk
Conventional linear benchmarked contracts tend to cause excessive pegging to the benchmark and thus price distortion of stocks in the benchmark. This paper studies the optimal delegation contract when there is principal-agent friction. Specifically, it explores the impacts of incorporating the risk of invested portfolio in the contract on optimal strategies of the principal and the agent as well as on equilibrium asset prices. When agency friction is severe, the optimal contract provides rewards for portfolio risk to improve risk sharing and grants compensation for index return to propel the agent to deviate from pegging to index. In equilibrium, the principal conducts index investment while the agent invests only in individual risky assets, and price distortion caused by agency friction is mitigated.
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来源期刊
CiteScore
6.40
自引率
5.40%
发文量
262
期刊介绍: The Journal of Banking and Finance (JBF) publishes theoretical and empirical research papers spanning all the major research fields in finance and banking. The aim of the Journal of Banking and Finance is to provide an outlet for the increasing flow of scholarly research concerning financial institutions and the money and capital markets within which they function. The Journal''s emphasis is on theoretical developments and their implementation, empirical, applied, and policy-oriented research in banking and other domestic and international financial institutions and markets. The Journal''s purpose is to improve communications between, and within, the academic and other research communities and policymakers and operational decision makers at financial institutions - private and public, national and international, and their regulators. The Journal is one of the largest Finance journals, with approximately 1500 new submissions per year, mainly in the following areas: Asset Management; Asset Pricing; Banking (Efficiency, Regulation, Risk Management, Solvency); Behavioural Finance; Capital Structure; Corporate Finance; Corporate Governance; Derivative Pricing and Hedging; Distribution Forecasting with Financial Applications; Entrepreneurial Finance; Empirical Finance; Financial Economics; Financial Markets (Alternative, Bonds, Currency, Commodity, Derivatives, Equity, Energy, Real Estate); FinTech; Fund Management; General Equilibrium Models; High-Frequency Trading; Intermediation; International Finance; Hedge Funds; Investments; Liquidity; Market Efficiency; Market Microstructure; Mergers and Acquisitions; Networks; Performance Analysis; Political Risk; Portfolio Optimization; Regulation of Financial Markets and Institutions; Risk Management and Analysis; Systemic Risk; Term Structure Models; Venture Capital.
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