合作与监管:绿色住房可持续发展的双重监管博弈

IF 6.9 2区 经济学 Q1 BUSINESS, FINANCE
Qianwen Li , Tingyu Qian , Qian Hua , Jialin Min , Yizhuo Zhao , Qingyuan Wang , Ruyin Long
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引用次数: 0

摘要

推广绿色住房可以显著降低建筑行业的能耗和温室气体排放,从而有助于实现双碳目标。然而,“洗绿”、贷款违约、绿色债务等风险的频繁发生,迫切需要加强政府对绿色住房市场的监管,完善银行资本监管机制,加强开发商和居民之间的合作,促进绿色住房的可持续发展,确保其可持续性和合规性。本文构建了政府、银行、开发商、居民等绿色住房核心利益相关者的四方演化博弈模型,阐明了政府与银行双重监管模式下各利益相关者的长期稳定选择。通过仿真和灵敏度分析进一步验证了双调节的有效性。研究结果表明:(1)在协同战略下,政府监管力度加大增加了银行参与监管的可能性,促进了双重监管模式的形成。在这种模式下,房地产开发商更有可能从事合规的绿色住房开发,居民也会选择购买绿色住房。(2)在监管策略下,激励性补贴和强制性处罚都是有效的。这些措施越强,房地产开发商越有可能选择合规的绿色住房开发。最后,根据研究结论,提出了促进绿色住宅可持续发展的建议。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Collaboration and regulation: A dual regulatory game for the sustainable development of green housing
The promotion of green housing can significantly reduce energy consumption and greenhouse gas emissions in the construction industry, thereby contributing to the achievement of the dual-carbon goal. However, the frequent occurrence of greenwashing, loan defaults, green debt, and other risks has created an urgent need for stronger government supervision of the green housing market, improved bank capital supervision mechanisms, and greater collaboration between property developer and residents to promote the sustainable development of green housing, ensuring its sustainability and compliance. This study constructs a four-party evolutionary game model involving the core stakeholders of green housing—government, bank, property developer, and resident—to clarify the long-term stable choices of each stakeholder under the dual regulation mode of government and bank. The effectiveness of dual regulation is further confirmed through simulation and sensitivity analysis. The study results indicate that: (1) Under the collaboration strategy, increased government regulation raises the likelihood that bank will also regulate, facilitating the formation of a dual regulation mode. Property developer is more likely to engage in compliant green housing development under this mode, and residents will choose to buy green housing. (2) Under the regulatory strategy, both incentive subsidies and mandatory penalties are effective. The stronger these measures, the more likely property developer will choose compliant green housing development. Finally, based on the study's conclusions, recommendations are proposed to promote the sustainable development of green housing.
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来源期刊
CiteScore
11.20
自引率
9.20%
发文量
240
期刊介绍: Research in International Business and Finance (RIBAF) seeks to consolidate its position as a premier scholarly vehicle of academic finance. The Journal publishes high quality, insightful, well-written papers that explore current and new issues in international finance. Papers that foster dialogue, innovation, and intellectual risk-taking in financial studies; as well as shed light on the interaction between finance and broader societal concerns are particularly appreciated. The Journal welcomes submissions that seek to expand the boundaries of academic finance and otherwise challenge the discipline. Papers studying finance using a variety of methodologies; as well as interdisciplinary studies will be considered for publication. Papers that examine topical issues using extensive international data sets are welcome. Single-country studies can also be considered for publication provided that they develop novel methodological and theoretical approaches or fall within the Journal''s priority themes. It is especially important that single-country studies communicate to the reader why the particular chosen country is especially relevant to the issue being investigated. [...] The scope of topics that are most interesting to RIBAF readers include the following: -Financial markets and institutions -Financial practices and sustainability -The impact of national culture on finance -The impact of formal and informal institutions on finance -Privatizations, public financing, and nonprofit issues in finance -Interdisciplinary financial studies -Finance and international development -International financial crises and regulation -Financialization studies -International financial integration and architecture -Behavioral aspects in finance -Consumer finance -Methodologies and conceptualization issues related to finance
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