群体可以是理性的。

IF 4.3 3区 综合性期刊 Q1 MULTIDISCIPLINARY SCIENCES
Gal A Kaminka
{"title":"群体可以是理性的。","authors":"Gal A Kaminka","doi":"10.1098/rsta.2024.0136","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"<p><p>The emergence of collective order in swarms from local, myopic interactions of their individual members is of interest to biology, sociology, psychology, computer science, robotics, physics and economics. <i>Cooperative swarms</i>, whose members unknowingly work towards a common goal, are particularly perplexing: members sometimes take individual actions that maximize collective utility, at the expense of their own. This seems to contradict expectations of individual rationality. Moreover, members choose these actions without knowing their effect on the collective utility. I examine this puzzle through game theory, machine learning and robots. I show that in some settings, the <i>collective utility</i> can be transformed into <i>individual rewards</i> that can be measured locally: when interacting, members individually choose actions that receive a reward based on how quickly the interaction was resolved, how much individual work time is gained and the approximate effect on others. This internally measurable reward is individually and independently maximized by learning. This results in a equilibrium, where the learned response of each individual maximizes both its individual reward and the collective utility, i.e. both the swarm and the individuals are rational.This article is part of the theme issue 'The road forward with swarm systems'.</p>","PeriodicalId":19879,"journal":{"name":"Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society A: Mathematical, Physical and Engineering Sciences","volume":"383 2289","pages":"20240136"},"PeriodicalIF":4.3000,"publicationDate":"2025-01-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC11779537/pdf/","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Swarms can be rational.\",\"authors\":\"Gal A Kaminka\",\"doi\":\"10.1098/rsta.2024.0136\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"<p><p>The emergence of collective order in swarms from local, myopic interactions of their individual members is of interest to biology, sociology, psychology, computer science, robotics, physics and economics. <i>Cooperative swarms</i>, whose members unknowingly work towards a common goal, are particularly perplexing: members sometimes take individual actions that maximize collective utility, at the expense of their own. This seems to contradict expectations of individual rationality. Moreover, members choose these actions without knowing their effect on the collective utility. I examine this puzzle through game theory, machine learning and robots. I show that in some settings, the <i>collective utility</i> can be transformed into <i>individual rewards</i> that can be measured locally: when interacting, members individually choose actions that receive a reward based on how quickly the interaction was resolved, how much individual work time is gained and the approximate effect on others. This internally measurable reward is individually and independently maximized by learning. This results in a equilibrium, where the learned response of each individual maximizes both its individual reward and the collective utility, i.e. both the swarm and the individuals are rational.This article is part of the theme issue 'The road forward with swarm systems'.</p>\",\"PeriodicalId\":19879,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society A: Mathematical, Physical and Engineering Sciences\",\"volume\":\"383 2289\",\"pages\":\"20240136\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":4.3000,\"publicationDate\":\"2025-01-30\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC11779537/pdf/\",\"citationCount\":\"0\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society A: Mathematical, Physical and Engineering Sciences\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"103\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.1098/rsta.2024.0136\",\"RegionNum\":3,\"RegionCategory\":\"综合性期刊\",\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"Q1\",\"JCRName\":\"MULTIDISCIPLINARY SCIENCES\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society A: Mathematical, Physical and Engineering Sciences","FirstCategoryId":"103","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1098/rsta.2024.0136","RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"综合性期刊","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q1","JCRName":"MULTIDISCIPLINARY SCIENCES","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0

摘要

生物、社会学、心理学、计算机科学、机器人学、物理学和经济学都对群体中的集体秩序的出现感兴趣。合作群体的成员在不知不觉中朝着一个共同的目标努力,这尤其令人困惑:成员有时会以牺牲自己为代价,采取个人行动,使集体效用最大化。这似乎与个人理性的期望相矛盾。此外,成员选择这些行为时并不知道它们对集体效用的影响。我通过博弈论、机器学习和机器人来研究这个难题。我指出,在某些情况下,集体效用可以转化为可以局部衡量的个人奖励:在互动时,成员根据解决互动的速度、获得的个人工作时间以及对他人的近似影响,单独选择获得奖励的行动。这种内部可测量的奖励可以通过学习而独立地最大化。这就形成了一种均衡,在这种均衡中,每个个体的学习反应都使其个人回报和集体效用最大化,即群体和个体都是理性的。本文是“群系统的前进之路”主题的一部分。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Swarms can be rational.

The emergence of collective order in swarms from local, myopic interactions of their individual members is of interest to biology, sociology, psychology, computer science, robotics, physics and economics. Cooperative swarms, whose members unknowingly work towards a common goal, are particularly perplexing: members sometimes take individual actions that maximize collective utility, at the expense of their own. This seems to contradict expectations of individual rationality. Moreover, members choose these actions without knowing their effect on the collective utility. I examine this puzzle through game theory, machine learning and robots. I show that in some settings, the collective utility can be transformed into individual rewards that can be measured locally: when interacting, members individually choose actions that receive a reward based on how quickly the interaction was resolved, how much individual work time is gained and the approximate effect on others. This internally measurable reward is individually and independently maximized by learning. This results in a equilibrium, where the learned response of each individual maximizes both its individual reward and the collective utility, i.e. both the swarm and the individuals are rational.This article is part of the theme issue 'The road forward with swarm systems'.

求助全文
通过发布文献求助,成功后即可免费获取论文全文。 去求助
来源期刊
CiteScore
9.30
自引率
2.00%
发文量
367
审稿时长
3 months
期刊介绍: Continuing its long history of influential scientific publishing, Philosophical Transactions A publishes high-quality theme issues on topics of current importance and general interest within the physical, mathematical and engineering sciences, guest-edited by leading authorities and comprising new research, reviews and opinions from prominent researchers.
×
引用
GB/T 7714-2015
复制
MLA
复制
APA
复制
导出至
BibTeX EndNote RefMan NoteFirst NoteExpress
×
提示
您的信息不完整,为了账户安全,请先补充。
现在去补充
×
提示
您因"违规操作"
具体请查看互助需知
我知道了
×
提示
确定
请完成安全验证×
copy
已复制链接
快去分享给好友吧!
我知道了
右上角分享
点击右上角分享
0
联系我们:info@booksci.cn Book学术提供免费学术资源搜索服务,方便国内外学者检索中英文文献。致力于提供最便捷和优质的服务体验。 Copyright © 2023 布克学术 All rights reserved.
京ICP备2023020795号-1
ghs 京公网安备 11010802042870号
Book学术文献互助
Book学术文献互助群
群 号:481959085
Book学术官方微信