K-Corruption Intermittent Attacks for Violating the Codiagnosability

In this work, we address the codiagnosability analysis problem of a networked discrete event system under malicious attacks. The considered system is modeled by a labeled Petri net and is monitored by a series of sites, in which each site possesses its own set of sensors, without requiring communication among sites or to any coordinators. A net is said to be codiagnosable with respect to a fault if at least one site could deduce the occurrence of this fault within finite steps. In this context, we focus on a type of malicious attack that is called stealthy intermittent replacement attack. The stealthiness demands that the corrupted observations should be consistent with the system's normal behavior, while the intermittent replacement setting entails that the replaced transition labels must be recovered within a bounded of consecutive corrupted observations (called as K-corruption intermittent attack). Particularly, there exists a coordination between attackers that are separately effected on different sites, which holds the same corrupted observation for each common transition under attacks. From an attacker viewpoint, this work aims to design K- corruption intermittent attacks for violating the codiagnosability of systems. For this purpose, we propose an attack automaton to analyze K-corruption intermittent attack for each site, and build a new structure called complete attack graph that is used to analyze all the potential attacked paths. Finally, an algorithm is inferred to obtain the K-corruption intermittent attacks, and examples are given to show the proposed attack strategy.