代理受限的真实设施位置博弈

IF 0.9 4区数学 Q4 COMPUTER SCIENCE, INTERDISCIPLINARY APPLICATIONS

Journal of Combinatorial Optimization Pub Date : 2025-01-20 DOI:10.1007/s10878-025-01258-7

Argyrios Deligkas, Mohammad Lotfi, Alexandros A. Voudouris

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引用次数: 0

摘要

我们考虑一个真实设施位置博弈，在这个博弈中，有一组在实数线上拥有私有位置的智能体，目标是从智能体报告的位置集中选择的不同位置放置许多设施。给定一个可行的解决方案，每个代理承受的单个成本要么是到所有设施的总距离（和变），要么是到最远设施的距离（最大变）。对于这两种变体，我们在社会成本方面展示了防策略机制的近似比率的严格界限，即代理的总个人成本。

本文章由计算机程序翻译，如有差异，请以英文原文为准。

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Agent-constrained truthful facility location games

We consider a truthful facility location game in which there is a set of agents with private locations on the line of real numbers, and the goal is to place a number of facilities at different locations chosen from the set of those reported by the agents. Given a feasible solution, each agent suffers an individual cost that is either its total distance to all facilities (sum-variant) or its distance to the farthest facility (max-variant). For both variants, we show tight bounds on the approximation ratio of strategyproof mechanisms in terms of the social cost, the total individual cost of the agents.

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来源期刊

Journal of Combinatorial Optimization 数学-计算机：跨学科应用

CiteScore

2.00

自引率

10.00%

发文量

审稿时长

6 months

期刊介绍： The objective of Journal of Combinatorial Optimization is to advance and promote the theory and applications of combinatorial optimization, which is an area of research at the intersection of applied mathematics, computer science, and operations research and which overlaps with many other areas such as computation complexity, computational biology, VLSI design, communication networks, and management science. It includes complexity analysis and algorithm design for combinatorial optimization problems, numerical experiments and problem discovery with applications in science and engineering. The Journal of Combinatorial Optimization publishes refereed papers dealing with all theoretical, computational and applied aspects of combinatorial optimization. It also publishes reviews of appropriate books and special issues of journals.