供应中断和定价问题,广告,和采购策略在零售双寡头垄断市场

IF 4.4 3区 管理学 Q1 OPERATIONS RESEARCH & MANAGEMENT SCIENCE
Reza Maihami, Devika Kannan, Mohammad Fattahi, Chunguang Bai
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引用次数: 0

摘要

零售商在经济中扮演着至关重要的角色,他们有效管理供应中断的能力会对他们的业绩和竞争力产生重大影响。本研究深入研究了零售市场的复杂动态,特别是在双寡头垄断环境中,两家主要零售商通过战略互动来最大化其利润。其目标是了解供应中断如何不仅影响定价和广告策略,还影响采购决策。提出了三种博弈结构来分析零售商之间的相互作用,目的是通过确定最优的销售价格和广告投资来实现总利润最大化。本文介绍了这些博弈的数学公式和基于采购策略(单、双或多采购策略)找到最优解的方法给出了一个广泛的数值算例,并进行了讨论和灵敏度分析。该研究的结果可以帮助决策者在存在中断的情况下选择最合适的采购策略。确定了零售商在中断和非中断两种情况下的最优定价和广告投资。该研究的结论是,在Stackelberg博弈中扮演领导者的角色比纳什博弈中的领导者更能获得更高的利润。此外,对于零售商来说,双重采购比多重采购更有利。这些管理见解为零售商在竞争激烈的市场中提高地位提供了有益的建议。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Supply disruptions and the problem of pricing, advertising, and sourcing strategies in a retail duopoly market

Retailers play a crucial role in the economy, and their ability to effectively manage supply disruptions can significantly impact their performance and competitiveness. This study delves into the complex dynamics of retail markets, particularly in duopoly settings, where two major retailers interact strategically to maximize their profits. The goal is to understand how supply disruptions influence not only pricing and advertising strategies but also sourcing decisions. Three game structures are presented to analyze interactions between retailers, aiming to maximize total profit by determining the optimal sale price and advertising investment. The paper introduces a mathematical formulation for these games and a methodology to find the optimal solution based on the sourcing strategy (single, dual, or multiple sourcing strategy).2

An extensive numerical example with discussion and sensitivity analysis is provided. The study's results can assist decision-makers in selecting the most appropriate sourcing strategy in the presence of disruptions. The optimal pricing and advertising investment in both disruption and non-disruption scenarios for retailers are identified. The study concludes that acting as the leader in the Stackelberg game rather than Nash leads to higher profits. Moreover, dual sourcing is more advantageous than multiple sourcing for retailers. The managerial insights offer useful recommendations for retailers to improve their position in the competitive market.

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来源期刊
Annals of Operations Research
Annals of Operations Research 管理科学-运筹学与管理科学
CiteScore
7.90
自引率
16.70%
发文量
596
审稿时长
8.4 months
期刊介绍: The Annals of Operations Research publishes peer-reviewed original articles dealing with key aspects of operations research, including theory, practice, and computation. The journal publishes full-length research articles, short notes, expositions and surveys, reports on computational studies, and case studies that present new and innovative practical applications. In addition to regular issues, the journal publishes periodic special volumes that focus on defined fields of operations research, ranging from the highly theoretical to the algorithmic and the applied. These volumes have one or more Guest Editors who are responsible for collecting the papers and overseeing the refereeing process.
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