薪酬委员会言行一致吗？委托书中叙述性披露的证据

IF 7.4 2区经济学 Q1 BUSINESS, FINANCE

Finance Research Letters Pub Date : 2024-12-10 DOI:10.1016/j.frl.2024.106637

Natalie Kyung Won Kim, Sewon Kwon, Jae Yong Shin

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引用次数: 0

摘要

委托书中的薪酬讨论和分析部分提供了薪酬委员会如何定义和应用其薪酬理念的叙述性数据。然而，这些理念——按绩效支付薪酬以及吸引和留住有才能的高管——在多大程度上转化为高管薪酬实践仍不清楚。为了解决这个问题，我们对2007年至2016年的委托书进行了文本分析，以检验薪酬委员会是否将高管薪酬与其声明的理念保持一致。调查结果显示，更注重绩效薪酬与更高的超额薪酬有关，尤其是在高管中没有总法律顾问、没有聘请薪酬顾问的公司。

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Do compensation committees do what they say they do? Evidence from narrative disclosure in proxy statements

The Compensation Discussion and Analysis section in proxy statements provides narrative data on how Compensation Committees define and apply their Compensation Philosophy. However, the extent to which these philosophies—pay-for-performance and the attraction and retention of talented executives—translate into executive compensation practices remains unclear. To address this, we conduct a textual analysis of proxy statements from 2007 to 2016 to examine whether Compensation Committees align executive compensation with their stated philosophies. The findings show a stronger focus on pay-for-performance is linked to higher excess compensation, especially in firms lacking a general counsel among top officers and not employing a compensation consultant.

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来源期刊

Finance Research Letters BUSINESS, FINANCE-

CiteScore

11.10

自引率

14.40%

发文量

863

期刊介绍： Finance Research Letters welcomes submissions across all areas of finance, aiming for rapid publication of significant new findings. The journal particularly encourages papers that provide insight into the replicability of established results, examine the cross-national applicability of previous findings, challenge existing methodologies, or demonstrate methodological contingencies. Papers are invited in the following areas: Actuarial studies Alternative investments Asset Pricing Bankruptcy and liquidation Banks and other Depository Institutions Behavioral and experimental finance Bibliometric and Scientometric studies of finance Capital budgeting and corporate investment Capital markets and accounting Capital structure and payout policy Commodities Contagion, crises and interdependence Corporate governance Credit and fixed income markets and instruments Derivatives Emerging markets Energy Finance and Energy Markets Financial Econometrics Financial History Financial intermediation and money markets Financial markets and marketplaces Financial Mathematics and Econophysics Financial Regulation and Law Forecasting Frontier market studies International Finance Market efficiency, event studies Mergers, acquisitions and the market for corporate control Micro Finance Institutions Microstructure Non-bank Financial Institutions Personal Finance Portfolio choice and investing Real estate finance and investing Risk SME, Family and Entrepreneurial Finance