基于Shapley值的电网增强技术激励方案

Xinyang Rui;Omid Mirzapour;Mostafa Sahraei-Ardakani
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引用次数: 0

摘要

通过部署电网增强技术(get)实现输电系统的现代化是未来电网设计的基石。新的拥堵模式需要可再生能源弃电,这凸显了get的重要性。尽管人们广泛认识到get的重要性和好处,但它们的部署仍然相当有限。一个重要的障碍是缺乏适当的激励措施来部署和有效地操作政府信息服务。本文设计了一种基于股票交易在盘中市场中的表现来补偿股票交易的激励方案。奖励是根据GET操作实现的成本节约来确定的,并使用Shapley值分配给市场参与者。在改进的IEEE RTS 24总线和IEEE 300总线系统上对所提出的激励方案进行了数值研究。结果证实,设计的激励与系统目标是一致的:当成本节约实现时,GET所有者将得到补偿。以表现为基础的付款计划有三方面的好处:(i)它能根据系统的状况,促进现有政府间政府的有效运作;(ii)吸引政府间政府进一步部署;以及(iii)将风险从纳税人转移给投资者。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
An Incentive Scheme for Grid-Enhancing Technologies Based on the Shapley Value
Modernization of the transmission system via deploying grid-enhancing technologies (GETs) is a cornerstone of future grid design. New congestion patterns necessitating renewable energy curtailment highlight the significance of GETs. Despite the wide acknowledgment of the importance and benefits of GETs, their deployment remains fairly limited. One important barrier is the lack of proper incentives for deployment and efficient operation of GETs. This paper designs an incentive scheme to compensate GETs based on their performance in the intraday market. The rewards are determined based on the cost savings achieved by GET operations and are allocated to market participants using the Shapley value. The proposed incentive scheme is tested with numerical studies on modified IEEE RTS 24-bus and IEEE 300-bus systems. Results confirm that the designed incentive is aligned with the system objective: GET owners are compensated when cost savings are achieved. The benefits of a performance-based payment scheme are threefold: (i) it promotes efficient operation of existing GETs based on the state of the system, (ii) it attracts further GETs deployment, and (iii) moves the risk from ratepayers to the investors.
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