风险资本家是 IPO 的监督者还是哗众取宠者？来自新兴市场的新证据

IF 7.4 2区经济学 Q1 BUSINESS, FINANCE

Finance Research Letters Pub Date : 2024-11-07 DOI:10.1016/j.frl.2024.106430

Xiaojie Ye , Dan Yang , Jiaqin Zhong

{"title":"风险资本家是 IPO 的监督者还是哗众取宠者？来自新兴市场的新证据","authors":"Xiaojie Ye , Dan Yang , Jiaqin Zhong","doi":"10.1016/j.frl.2024.106430","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>This study investigates the role of venture capitalists (VCs) in initial public offerings (IPOs) in the Chinese Sci-Tech Innovation Board, where VCs are highly concentrated. We find that VC-backed firms are likelier to succeed in IPOs; however, they exhibit greater IPO underpricing and perform poorly post-IPO. Findings support the grandstanding model. We identify that VC-backed firms do not receive fewer IPO inquiries, and the young-VC group has greater effects on IPO underpricing and post-IPO performance. Further, we explore the well-known A-share Main Board situation but obtain different results.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":12167,"journal":{"name":"Finance Research Letters","volume":"71 ","pages":"Article 106430"},"PeriodicalIF":7.4000,"publicationDate":"2024-11-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Are venture capitalists monitors or claptrap players in IPOs? New evidence from an emerging market\",\"authors\":\"Xiaojie Ye , Dan Yang , Jiaqin Zhong\",\"doi\":\"10.1016/j.frl.2024.106430\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"<div><div>This study investigates the role of venture capitalists (VCs) in initial public offerings (IPOs) in the Chinese Sci-Tech Innovation Board, where VCs are highly concentrated. We find that VC-backed firms are likelier to succeed in IPOs; however, they exhibit greater IPO underpricing and perform poorly post-IPO. Findings support the grandstanding model. We identify that VC-backed firms do not receive fewer IPO inquiries, and the young-VC group has greater effects on IPO underpricing and post-IPO performance. Further, we explore the well-known A-share Main Board situation but obtain different results.</div></div>\",\"PeriodicalId\":12167,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Finance Research Letters\",\"volume\":\"71 \",\"pages\":\"Article 106430\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":7.4000,\"publicationDate\":\"2024-11-07\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"0\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Finance Research Letters\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"96\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S1544612324014594\",\"RegionNum\":2,\"RegionCategory\":\"经济学\",\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"Q1\",\"JCRName\":\"BUSINESS, FINANCE\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Finance Research Letters","FirstCategoryId":"96","ListUrlMain":"https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S1544612324014594","RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q1","JCRName":"BUSINESS, FINANCE","Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

摘要

本研究探讨了风险投资（VC）在风险投资高度集中的中国科技创新板首次公开发行（IPO）中的作用。我们发现，风险投资支持的企业更有可能在首次公开募股中取得成功；然而，它们表现出更大的首次公开募股定价不足，并且在首次公开募股后表现不佳。研究结果支持哗众取宠模型。我们发现，风险投资支持的公司收到的首次公开募股询价并没有减少，而年轻的风险投资群体对首次公开募股定价偏低和上市后表现的影响更大。此外，我们还探讨了众所周知的 A 股主板情况，但得到了不同的结果。

本文章由计算机程序翻译，如有差异，请以英文原文为准。

查看原文本刊更多论文

Are venture capitalists monitors or claptrap players in IPOs? New evidence from an emerging market

This study investigates the role of venture capitalists (VCs) in initial public offerings (IPOs) in the Chinese Sci-Tech Innovation Board, where VCs are highly concentrated. We find that VC-backed firms are likelier to succeed in IPOs; however, they exhibit greater IPO underpricing and perform poorly post-IPO. Findings support the grandstanding model. We identify that VC-backed firms do not receive fewer IPO inquiries, and the young-VC group has greater effects on IPO underpricing and post-IPO performance. Further, we explore the well-known A-share Main Board situation but obtain different results.

求助全文

通过发布文献求助，成功后即可免费获取论文全文。去求助

来源期刊

Finance Research Letters BUSINESS, FINANCE-

CiteScore

11.10

自引率

14.40%

发文量

863

期刊介绍： Finance Research Letters welcomes submissions across all areas of finance, aiming for rapid publication of significant new findings. The journal particularly encourages papers that provide insight into the replicability of established results, examine the cross-national applicability of previous findings, challenge existing methodologies, or demonstrate methodological contingencies. Papers are invited in the following areas: Actuarial studies Alternative investments Asset Pricing Bankruptcy and liquidation Banks and other Depository Institutions Behavioral and experimental finance Bibliometric and Scientometric studies of finance Capital budgeting and corporate investment Capital markets and accounting Capital structure and payout policy Commodities Contagion, crises and interdependence Corporate governance Credit and fixed income markets and instruments Derivatives Emerging markets Energy Finance and Energy Markets Financial Econometrics Financial History Financial intermediation and money markets Financial markets and marketplaces Financial Mathematics and Econophysics Financial Regulation and Law Forecasting Frontier market studies International Finance Market efficiency, event studies Mergers, acquisitions and the market for corporate control Micro Finance Institutions Microstructure Non-bank Financial Institutions Personal Finance Portfolio choice and investing Real estate finance and investing Risk SME, Family and Entrepreneurial Finance