报酬分布不对称的异质种群中的合作进化。

IF 2.7 2区 数学 Q1 MATHEMATICS, APPLIED
Chaos Pub Date : 2024-11-01 DOI:10.1063/5.0240668
Zhixue He, Xiaoyue Wang, Qiwen Zhao, Lei Shi
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引用次数: 0

摘要

合作的产生和维持是一个复杂而有趣的问题,尤其是在现实世界中,个体差异导致的互动不对称现象十分普遍。本研究通过考虑由两类个体(强者和弱者)组成的人群,研究非对称报酬分配如何影响公共物品博弈中的合作。这种不对称性体现在,与弱者相比,强者能从公共池中获得更大份额的收益。我们的研究结果表明,在混合良好的种群中,非对称报酬分配可以促进合作,并引发强弱玩家子种群之间合作的共同演化。然而,在结构化种群中,非对称报酬分配对合作的影响取决于强者的比例及其报酬分享的程度,这既可能促进合作,也可能抑制合作。通过根据强弱参与者在网格网络上的空间排列调整它们之间的互动概率,我们发现适度的互动概率能最有效地维持合作。这项研究为非对称条件下的合作动态提供了宝贵的见解,凸显了非对称互动在合作演化过程中的复杂作用。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Evolution of cooperation in heterogeneous populations with asymmetric payoff distribution.

The emergence and maintenance of cooperation is a complex and intriguing issue, especially in the context of widespread asymmetries in interactions that arise from individual differences in real-world scenarios. This study investigates how asymmetric payoff distribution affects cooperation in public goods games by considering a population composed of two types of individuals: strong and weak. The asymmetry is reflected in the fact that strong players receive a larger share of the public pool compared to weak players. Our results demonstrate that asymmetric payoff distribution can promote cooperation in well-mixed populations and trigger the co-evolution of cooperation between sub-populations of strong and weak players. In structured populations, however, the effect of asymmetric payoff distribution on cooperation is contingent on the proportion of strong players and the extent of their payoff share, which can either foster or inhibit cooperation. By adjusting the interaction probability between strong and weak players based on their spatial arrangement on lattice networks, we find that moderate interaction probabilities most effectively maintain cooperation. This study provides valuable insights into the dynamics of cooperation under asymmetric conditions, highlighting the complex role of asymmetrical interactions in the evolution of cooperation.

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来源期刊
Chaos
Chaos 物理-物理:数学物理
CiteScore
5.20
自引率
13.80%
发文量
448
审稿时长
2.3 months
期刊介绍: Chaos: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Nonlinear Science is a peer-reviewed journal devoted to increasing the understanding of nonlinear phenomena and describing the manifestations in a manner comprehensible to researchers from a broad spectrum of disciplines.
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