商业协会如何支持合同执行?匈牙利的证据

IF 2.5 4区 经济学 Q2 ECONOMICS
Károly Mike, István Boza, Gábor Tamás Molnár
{"title":"商业协会如何支持合同执行?匈牙利的证据","authors":"Károly Mike,&nbsp;István Boza,&nbsp;Gábor Tamás Molnár","doi":"10.1111/apce.12479","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"<p>Business associations (BAs) are often mentioned among formal private-order institutions that support contract enforcement. Despite their ubiquity, evidence about their actual roles is still very limited. We explore empirically four mechanisms through which they can support the credibility of contractual commitments: member selection, norm enforcement, dispute resolution and information sharing. In a developed legal context, firm-level data from an economy-wide managerial survey show that BAs support contractual trust among members, in members by outsiders as well as in outsiders by members. Member selection and information sharing stand out as the most important mechanisms: They help all three relationship types. Dispute resolution helps overcome opportunism between members only. Formalized norm enforcement is a signal of trustworthiness for outsiders. Economic theory suggests that BAs can help establish trust beyond personal and local networks. We find strong evidence that they indeed do.</p>","PeriodicalId":51632,"journal":{"name":"Annals of Public and Cooperative Economics","volume":"95 4","pages":"1021-1060"},"PeriodicalIF":2.5000,"publicationDate":"2024-09-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/apce.12479","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"How do business associations support contract enforcement? Evidence from Hungary\",\"authors\":\"Károly Mike,&nbsp;István Boza,&nbsp;Gábor Tamás Molnár\",\"doi\":\"10.1111/apce.12479\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"<p>Business associations (BAs) are often mentioned among formal private-order institutions that support contract enforcement. Despite their ubiquity, evidence about their actual roles is still very limited. We explore empirically four mechanisms through which they can support the credibility of contractual commitments: member selection, norm enforcement, dispute resolution and information sharing. In a developed legal context, firm-level data from an economy-wide managerial survey show that BAs support contractual trust among members, in members by outsiders as well as in outsiders by members. Member selection and information sharing stand out as the most important mechanisms: They help all three relationship types. Dispute resolution helps overcome opportunism between members only. Formalized norm enforcement is a signal of trustworthiness for outsiders. Economic theory suggests that BAs can help establish trust beyond personal and local networks. We find strong evidence that they indeed do.</p>\",\"PeriodicalId\":51632,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Annals of Public and Cooperative Economics\",\"volume\":\"95 4\",\"pages\":\"1021-1060\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":2.5000,\"publicationDate\":\"2024-09-26\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/apce.12479\",\"citationCount\":\"0\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Annals of Public and Cooperative Economics\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"96\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/apce.12479\",\"RegionNum\":4,\"RegionCategory\":\"经济学\",\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"Q2\",\"JCRName\":\"ECONOMICS\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Annals of Public and Cooperative Economics","FirstCategoryId":"96","ListUrlMain":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/apce.12479","RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q2","JCRName":"ECONOMICS","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0

摘要

在支持合同执行的正规私人机构中,商业协会(BAs)经常被提及。尽管它们无处不在,但有关其实际作用的证据仍然非常有限。我们从实证角度探讨了商协会支持契约承诺可信度的四种机制:成员选择、规范执行、争端解决和信息共享。在发达的法律环境下,来自全经济管理调查的公司层面数据显示,商业监管机构支持成员之间、外部成员对成员以及外部成员对成员的契约信任。成员选择和信息共享是最重要的机制:它们对所有三种关系类型都有帮助。争端解决机制只有助于克服成员之间的机会主义。正式的规范执行对外界来说是一种值得信赖的信号。经济理论认为,BA 可以帮助建立超越个人和本地网络的信任。我们发现了强有力的证据,证明它们确实如此。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。

How do business associations support contract enforcement? Evidence from Hungary

How do business associations support contract enforcement? Evidence from Hungary

Business associations (BAs) are often mentioned among formal private-order institutions that support contract enforcement. Despite their ubiquity, evidence about their actual roles is still very limited. We explore empirically four mechanisms through which they can support the credibility of contractual commitments: member selection, norm enforcement, dispute resolution and information sharing. In a developed legal context, firm-level data from an economy-wide managerial survey show that BAs support contractual trust among members, in members by outsiders as well as in outsiders by members. Member selection and information sharing stand out as the most important mechanisms: They help all three relationship types. Dispute resolution helps overcome opportunism between members only. Formalized norm enforcement is a signal of trustworthiness for outsiders. Economic theory suggests that BAs can help establish trust beyond personal and local networks. We find strong evidence that they indeed do.

求助全文
通过发布文献求助,成功后即可免费获取论文全文。 去求助
来源期刊
CiteScore
3.80
自引率
12.50%
发文量
37
×
引用
GB/T 7714-2015
复制
MLA
复制
APA
复制
导出至
BibTeX EndNote RefMan NoteFirst NoteExpress
×
提示
您的信息不完整,为了账户安全,请先补充。
现在去补充
×
提示
您因"违规操作"
具体请查看互助需知
我知道了
×
提示
确定
请完成安全验证×
copy
已复制链接
快去分享给好友吧!
我知道了
右上角分享
点击右上角分享
0
联系我们:info@booksci.cn Book学术提供免费学术资源搜索服务,方便国内外学者检索中英文文献。致力于提供最便捷和优质的服务体验。 Copyright © 2023 布克学术 All rights reserved.
京ICP备2023020795号-1
ghs 京公网安备 11010802042870号
Book学术文献互助
Book学术文献互助群
群 号:481959085
Book学术官方微信