债务期限和现金持有量的边际价值

IF 7.4 2区经济学 Q1 BUSINESS, FINANCE

Finance Research Letters Pub Date : 2024-10-28 DOI:10.1016/j.frl.2024.106352

Hail Jung , Sanghak Choi

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引用次数: 0

摘要

本研究探讨了债务期限对现金持有边际价值的影响。研究认为，短期债务是一种重要的治理机制，它可以减少代理冲突，使管理者的行为与股东利益保持一致。以美国上市公司为样本，研究结果表明，短期债务比例较高的公司现金边际值更高，这反映了资源配置效率更高，管理者机会主义减少。与短期债务相关的资本市场频繁互动的必要性缓解了代理冲突。此外，研究还探讨了三种潜在机制：财务约束、管理道德风险和信息不对称。

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Debt maturity and the marginal value of cash holdings

This study investigates the impact of debt maturity on the marginal value of cash holdings. It posits that short-term debt acts as a crucial governance mechanism by reducing agency conflicts and aligning managerial actions with shareholder interests. Using a sample of U.S. public firms, the results indicate that firms with higher proportions of short-term debt have a greater marginal value of cash, reflecting more efficient resource allocation and reduced managerial opportunism. The necessity for frequent capital market interactions associated with short-term debt mitigates agency conflicts. Additionally, the study explores three potential mechanisms: financial constraints, managerial moral hazard, and information asymmetry.

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来源期刊

Finance Research Letters BUSINESS, FINANCE-

CiteScore

11.10

自引率

14.40%

发文量

863

期刊介绍： Finance Research Letters welcomes submissions across all areas of finance, aiming for rapid publication of significant new findings. The journal particularly encourages papers that provide insight into the replicability of established results, examine the cross-national applicability of previous findings, challenge existing methodologies, or demonstrate methodological contingencies. Papers are invited in the following areas: Actuarial studies Alternative investments Asset Pricing Bankruptcy and liquidation Banks and other Depository Institutions Behavioral and experimental finance Bibliometric and Scientometric studies of finance Capital budgeting and corporate investment Capital markets and accounting Capital structure and payout policy Commodities Contagion, crises and interdependence Corporate governance Credit and fixed income markets and instruments Derivatives Emerging markets Energy Finance and Energy Markets Financial Econometrics Financial History Financial intermediation and money markets Financial markets and marketplaces Financial Mathematics and Econophysics Financial Regulation and Law Forecasting Frontier market studies International Finance Market efficiency, event studies Mergers, acquisitions and the market for corporate control Micro Finance Institutions Microstructure Non-bank Financial Institutions Personal Finance Portfolio choice and investing Real estate finance and investing Risk SME, Family and Entrepreneurial Finance