Eve Florianne Fabre , Damien Mouratille , Vincent Bonnemains , Grazia Pia Palmiotti , Mickael Causse
{"title":"以人工代理为顾问做出道德决策。fNIRS 研究","authors":"Eve Florianne Fabre , Damien Mouratille , Vincent Bonnemains , Grazia Pia Palmiotti , Mickael Causse","doi":"10.1016/j.chbah.2024.100096","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>Artificial Intelligence (AI) is on the verge of impacting every domain of our lives. It is increasingly being used as an advisor to assist in making decisions. The present study aimed at investigating the influence of moral arguments provided by AI-advisors (i.e., decision aid tool) on human moral decision-making and the associated neural correlates. Participants were presented with sacrificial moral dilemmas and had to make moral decisions either by themselves (i.e., baseline run) or with AI-advisors that provided utilitarian or deontological arguments (i.e., AI-advised run), while their brain activity was measured using an <em>f</em>NIRS device. Overall, AI-advisors significantly influenced participants. Longer response times and a decrease in right dorsolateral prefrontal cortex activity were observed in response to deontological arguments than to utilitarian arguments. Being provided with deontological arguments by machines appears to have led to a decreased appraisal of the affective response to the dilemmas. This resulted in a reduced level of utilitarianism, supposedly in an attempt to avoid behaving in a less cold-blooded way than machines and preserve their (self-)image. Taken together, these results suggest that motivational power can led to a voluntary up- and down-regulation of affective processes along moral decision-making.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":100324,"journal":{"name":"Computers in Human Behavior: Artificial Humans","volume":"2 2","pages":"Article 100096"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2024-08-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Making moral decisions with artificial agents as advisors. A fNIRS study\",\"authors\":\"Eve Florianne Fabre , Damien Mouratille , Vincent Bonnemains , Grazia Pia Palmiotti , Mickael Causse\",\"doi\":\"10.1016/j.chbah.2024.100096\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"<div><div>Artificial Intelligence (AI) is on the verge of impacting every domain of our lives. It is increasingly being used as an advisor to assist in making decisions. The present study aimed at investigating the influence of moral arguments provided by AI-advisors (i.e., decision aid tool) on human moral decision-making and the associated neural correlates. Participants were presented with sacrificial moral dilemmas and had to make moral decisions either by themselves (i.e., baseline run) or with AI-advisors that provided utilitarian or deontological arguments (i.e., AI-advised run), while their brain activity was measured using an <em>f</em>NIRS device. Overall, AI-advisors significantly influenced participants. Longer response times and a decrease in right dorsolateral prefrontal cortex activity were observed in response to deontological arguments than to utilitarian arguments. Being provided with deontological arguments by machines appears to have led to a decreased appraisal of the affective response to the dilemmas. This resulted in a reduced level of utilitarianism, supposedly in an attempt to avoid behaving in a less cold-blooded way than machines and preserve their (self-)image. Taken together, these results suggest that motivational power can led to a voluntary up- and down-regulation of affective processes along moral decision-making.</div></div>\",\"PeriodicalId\":100324,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Computers in Human Behavior: Artificial Humans\",\"volume\":\"2 2\",\"pages\":\"Article 100096\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.0000,\"publicationDate\":\"2024-08-01\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"0\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Computers in Human Behavior: Artificial Humans\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S2949882124000562\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"\",\"JCRName\":\"\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Computers in Human Behavior: Artificial Humans","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S2949882124000562","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
Making moral decisions with artificial agents as advisors. A fNIRS study
Artificial Intelligence (AI) is on the verge of impacting every domain of our lives. It is increasingly being used as an advisor to assist in making decisions. The present study aimed at investigating the influence of moral arguments provided by AI-advisors (i.e., decision aid tool) on human moral decision-making and the associated neural correlates. Participants were presented with sacrificial moral dilemmas and had to make moral decisions either by themselves (i.e., baseline run) or with AI-advisors that provided utilitarian or deontological arguments (i.e., AI-advised run), while their brain activity was measured using an fNIRS device. Overall, AI-advisors significantly influenced participants. Longer response times and a decrease in right dorsolateral prefrontal cortex activity were observed in response to deontological arguments than to utilitarian arguments. Being provided with deontological arguments by machines appears to have led to a decreased appraisal of the affective response to the dilemmas. This resulted in a reduced level of utilitarianism, supposedly in an attempt to avoid behaving in a less cold-blooded way than machines and preserve their (self-)image. Taken together, these results suggest that motivational power can led to a voluntary up- and down-regulation of affective processes along moral decision-making.