有关决策方法的信息的缺点：具有自适应期望的动态库诺博弈

IF 2.3 3区物理与天体物理 Q2 PHYSICS, MULTIDISCIPLINARY

Physics Letters A Pub Date : 2024-10-22 DOI:10.1016/j.physleta.2024.129995

Chun Wang , Wei Tang , Jinxiu Pi

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引用次数: 0

摘要

企业不仅能获得他人先前决策的信息，还能获得他人决策方法的信息，这种情况并不少见。然而，很少有文献研究动态库诺博弈中有关决策方法的信息。本文考虑的是一种具有自适应期望的动态库诺博弈。假设每个企业都额外获得了其他竞争者决策方法的信息，并利用这些信息来估计其他企业下一期的产出。理论分析和数值模拟都证明，信息会导致原始库诺-纳什均衡的稳定性下降。这意味着有界理性企业在某些情况下需要警惕有关决策方法的信息。

本文章由计算机程序翻译，如有差异，请以英文原文为准。

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Demerit of the information concerning decision-making methodology: A dynamic Cournot game with adaptive expectation

It is not uncommon for firms to gain access to the information concerning not only the previous decisions of others but also their decision-making methodologies. However, few literatures study the information concerning decision-making methodologies in dynamic Cournot games. This paper considers a dynamic Cournot game with adaptive expectation. It is assumed that each firm extra acquires the information regarding the other competitors' decision-making methodologies, and the information will be employed to estimate the outputs of other firms in the next period. The information leads to a decline in the stability of the original Cournot-Nash equilibrium, as demonstrated by both theoretical analysis and numerical simulation. It implies that boundedly rational firms need be vigilant for the information concerning decision-making methodologies in certain cases.

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来源期刊

Physics Letters A 物理-物理：综合

CiteScore

5.10

自引率

3.80%

发文量

493

审稿时长

30 days

期刊介绍： Physics Letters A offers an exciting publication outlet for novel and frontier physics. It encourages the submission of new research on: condensed matter physics, theoretical physics, nonlinear science, statistical physics, mathematical and computational physics, general and cross-disciplinary physics (including foundations), atomic, molecular and cluster physics, plasma and fluid physics, optical physics, biological physics and nanoscience. No articles on High Energy and Nuclear Physics are published in Physics Letters A. The journal''s high standard and wide dissemination ensures a broad readership amongst the physics community. Rapid publication times and flexible length restrictions give Physics Letters A the edge over other journals in the field.