财务约束和企业社会责任(CSR)下绿色以旧换新闭环供应链的决策制定

IF 6.7 1区 工程技术 Q1 COMPUTER SCIENCE, INTERDISCIPLINARY APPLICATIONS
Yongxi Yi, Xianwen He, Yuqiong Li, Chao Li
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引用次数: 0

摘要

绿色经济和循环经济是可持续发展中相互交织的两个重要主题,这就要求对它们进行整体处理,而不是像以往大多数情况下那样各自为政。因此,本文建立了一个由制造商、电子商务平台和回收商组成的闭环供应链模型。其中,拥有企业社会责任的制造商是游戏的领导者,负责绿色技术创新、产品制造和再制造。电子商务平台和回收商则负责在线销售和废旧产品回收。为了解决这个斯台克尔伯格博弈模型,我们区分了三种情况,即回收商资金充足、回收商从制造商处融资或电子商务平台融资受限。结果表明,在后两种情况下,如果借贷利率相同,这三种情况下的回收率、绿色创新水平、各方利润和社会总福利分别最高、次之和最低。在这两种融资模式下,利率都有一定程度的下降,有助于提高供应链绩效。制造商承担企业社会责任有助于提高其他各方的利润、回收率和绿色创新水平。然而,制造商的利润不升反降,这表明制造商应在一定程度上积极承担企业社会责任。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Decision-making in a green trade-ins closed-loop supply chain under financial constraints and corporate social responsibility (CSR)
The green and circular economy are two significant themes intertwined in sustainable development, which requires that they be dealt with integral rather than fragmented, as in most previous cases. Therefore, this paper models a closed-loop supply chain consisting of a manufacturer, an e-commerce platform, and a recycler. Among them, the manufacturer with CSR, the game leader, is responsible for green technology innovation, product manufacturing, and remanufacturing. The e-commerce platform and recycler follow online sales and recycling for used products. To solve this Stackelberg game model, we distinguish three scenarios, i.e., the recycler with sufficient funds, financially constrained recycler financing from the manufacturer, or the e-commerce platform. The results show that the recycling rate, the level of green innovation, the profit of each party, and total social welfare are the highest, second, and lowest in those three scenarios, respectively, if borrowing rates are the same in the latter two cases. The interest rate decreases to a certain extent under both financing models, contributing to improving supply chain performance. The manufacturer assumes CSR contributes to the profit of all other parties, the increase in the recycling rate, and the level of green innovation. However, the manufacturer’s profit decreases instead of rising, which reveals that the manufacturer should be actively assuming CSR to a certain extent.
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来源期刊
Computers & Industrial Engineering
Computers & Industrial Engineering 工程技术-工程:工业
CiteScore
12.70
自引率
12.70%
发文量
794
审稿时长
10.6 months
期刊介绍: Computers & Industrial Engineering (CAIE) is dedicated to researchers, educators, and practitioners in industrial engineering and related fields. Pioneering the integration of computers in research, education, and practice, industrial engineering has evolved to make computers and electronic communication integral to its domain. CAIE publishes original contributions focusing on the development of novel computerized methodologies to address industrial engineering problems. It also highlights the applications of these methodologies to issues within the broader industrial engineering and associated communities. The journal actively encourages submissions that push the boundaries of fundamental theories and concepts in industrial engineering techniques.
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