中国地方政府举债的驱动因素：非对称分权下的财政饥饿与竞争博弈

IF 4 2区地球科学 Q1 GEOGRAPHY

Applied Geography Pub Date : 2024-10-04 DOI:10.1016/j.apgeog.2024.103422

Yuanshuo Xu , Jiahe Liang , Yan Wu

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引用次数: 0

摘要

本文介绍了非对称财政分权推动地方政府借贷的两种机制：财政饥渴"（为解决预算财政缺口、利用土地资源和偿还现有贷款而借贷）和 "竞争博弈"（为争夺债券发行和国家资金而借贷）。通过分析 2006 年至 2015 年中国 290 个城市的数据集，我们发现地方政府借贷是由财政饥渴和城市间竞争共同驱动的。借贷并不局限于以增长为导向的目的。我们的地理加权面板回归揭示了两种借贷机制的空间模式，其中欠发达地区的借贷主要由财政饥渴驱动，而沿海发达地区则通过借贷积极参与城市间竞争。这些动力可能会加剧中国城市间的财政差距。

本文章由计算机程序翻译，如有差异，请以英文原文为准。

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Drivers of local government borrowing in China: Fiscal hunger and competition game under asymmetric decentralization

This paper contributes two mechanisms through which asymmetric fiscal decentralization drives local government borrowing: ‘fiscal hunger’ (borrowing to address budgetary fiscal gaps, leverage land resources, and pay off existing loans) and ‘competition game’ (borrowing to compete for bond issuance and state funds). Analyzing a dataset of 290 Chinese cities from 2006 to 2015, we find local government borrowing is driven by both fiscal hunger and inter-city competition. Borrowing is not confined to the growth-oriented purpose. Our Geographically Weighted Panel Regression uncovers the spatial patterns of two borrowing mechanisms, in which borrowing in less-developed regions is predominantly driven by fiscal hunger, while developed coastal regions actively engage in inter-city competition through borrowing. These dynamics may aggravate fiscal disparities among Chinese cities.

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来源期刊

Applied Geography GEOGRAPHY-

CiteScore

8.00

自引率

2.00%

发文量

134

期刊介绍： Applied Geography is a journal devoted to the publication of research which utilizes geographic approaches (human, physical, nature-society and GIScience) to resolve human problems that have a spatial dimension. These problems may be related to the assessment, management and allocation of the world physical and/or human resources. The underlying rationale of the journal is that only through a clear understanding of the relevant societal, physical, and coupled natural-humans systems can we resolve such problems. Papers are invited on any theme involving the application of geographical theory and methodology in the resolution of human problems.