关于 "NTRU+:使用简单编码方法构建紧凑型 NTRU"

IF 6.3 1区 计算机科学 Q1 COMPUTER SCIENCE, THEORY & METHODS
Joohee Lee;Hansol Ryu;Minju Lee;Jaehui Park
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引用次数: 0

摘要

在 IEEE TIFS 2023 中,提出了一种基于晶格的高效后量子密钥封装机制(KEM)--NTRU+,该机制也已提交给 KpqC 竞赛。在本文中,我们首次提出了一种有效的经典选择密文攻击,以可忽略不计的概率恢复 NTRU+ 的传输会话密钥。通过所提出的攻击,我们证明了所有建议的 NTRU+ 参数都不符合所宣称的 IND-CCA 安全性。此外,我们还阐述了安全证明中的一些缺陷,其中一部分引入了我们的攻击。我们还提出了一种修改 NTRU+ 方案的方法,以防御我们的攻击,同时保持其实用性能。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Cryptanalysis on “NTRU+: Compact Construction of NTRU Using Simple Encoding Method”
In IEEE TIFS 2023, NTRU+ has been proposed, an efficient lattice-based post-quantum Key Encapsulation Mechanism (KEM), which has also been submitted to the KpqC competition. In this paper, we propose an effective classical chosen ciphertext attack to recover the transmitted session key for NTRU+ with all but negligible probability for the first time. With the proposed attacks, we show that all the suggested parameters of NTRU+ do not satisfy the claimed IND-CCA security. Moreover, we elaborate on some flaws in the security proof, a part of which introduces our attack. We also suggest a way to modify the NTRU+ scheme to defend our attack while maintaining its practical performance.
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来源期刊
IEEE Transactions on Information Forensics and Security
IEEE Transactions on Information Forensics and Security 工程技术-工程:电子与电气
CiteScore
14.40
自引率
7.40%
发文量
234
审稿时长
6.5 months
期刊介绍: The IEEE Transactions on Information Forensics and Security covers the sciences, technologies, and applications relating to information forensics, information security, biometrics, surveillance and systems applications that incorporate these features
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