薪酬决定权的价值

IF 3.6 2区经济学 Q1 BUSINESS, FINANCE

Journal of Banking & Finance Pub Date : 2024-09-19 DOI:10.1016/j.jbankfin.2024.107311

Axel Kind , Marco Poltera , Johannes Zaia

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引用次数: 0

摘要

我们衡量了 "薪酬说"（SoP）--对高层管理人员薪酬的强制性股东投票--对投票权市场价值的影响。通过在 14 个经济体中交错引入 "薪酬说"，我们发现 "薪酬说 "并不会自动提高股东投票权的价值。更严格、更具约束力的SoP改革会提高投票权价值，而更宽松的SoP咨询法则会降低投票权价值。不向首席执行官支付过高薪酬的公司的投票权价值降幅最大。投票权价值还反映了一个国家的投资者保护水平、过去在《公司法》投票中的异议情况，并随着管理者薪酬的变化而动态调整。

本文章由计算机程序翻译，如有差异，请以英文原文为准。

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The value of say on pay

We measure the impact of “say on pay” (SoP) – mandatory shareholder votes on top-management compensation – on the market value of voting rights. By exploiting the staggered introduction of SoP across 14 economies, we show that SoP does not automatically increase the value of shareholder voting rights. While stricter, binding SoP reforms increase voting values, looser advisory SoP laws decrease them. Firms that do not pay their CEOs excessively experience the largest decreases in voting values. Voting values also reflect a country’s level of investor protection, past dissent in SoP ballots, and dynamically adjust to changes in managerial compensation.

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来源期刊

Journal of Banking & Finance Multiple-

CiteScore

6.40

自引率

5.40%

发文量

262

期刊介绍： The Journal of Banking and Finance (JBF) publishes theoretical and empirical research papers spanning all the major research fields in finance and banking. The aim of the Journal of Banking and Finance is to provide an outlet for the increasing flow of scholarly research concerning financial institutions and the money and capital markets within which they function. The Journal''s emphasis is on theoretical developments and their implementation, empirical, applied, and policy-oriented research in banking and other domestic and international financial institutions and markets. The Journal''s purpose is to improve communications between, and within, the academic and other research communities and policymakers and operational decision makers at financial institutions - private and public, national and international, and their regulators. The Journal is one of the largest Finance journals, with approximately 1500 new submissions per year, mainly in the following areas: Asset Management; Asset Pricing; Banking (Efficiency, Regulation, Risk Management, Solvency); Behavioural Finance; Capital Structure; Corporate Finance; Corporate Governance; Derivative Pricing and Hedging; Distribution Forecasting with Financial Applications; Entrepreneurial Finance; Empirical Finance; Financial Economics; Financial Markets (Alternative, Bonds, Currency, Commodity, Derivatives, Equity, Energy, Real Estate); FinTech; Fund Management; General Equilibrium Models; High-Frequency Trading; Intermediation; International Finance; Hedge Funds; Investments; Liquidity; Market Efficiency; Market Microstructure; Mergers and Acquisitions; Networks; Performance Analysis; Political Risk; Portfolio Optimization; Regulation of Financial Markets and Institutions; Risk Management and Analysis; Systemic Risk; Term Structure Models; Venture Capital.