用于车辆计算资源供应和弹性服务的真实双重拍卖机制

IF 4.4 2区 计算机科学 Q1 COMPUTER SCIENCE, HARDWARE & ARCHITECTURE
Xi Liu , Jun Liu , Weidong Li
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引用次数: 0

摘要

智能汽车配备了强大的计算和传感资源,可作为多功能移动计算平台,为用户提供多种资源。本研究侧重于资源调配和弹性服务,以解决车载计算资源调配的首要问题。它引入了弹性传感服务,使用户能够声明多个请求区域以获取传感数据。当单个车辆无法单独完成任务时,它允许各种车辆协作为单个用户提供服务。这种基于双重拍卖的方法涉及一个有多个自利用户和车辆的市场。主要目标是设计一种社会福利最大化的机制。首先,贪婪机制提供了不同的任务分配策略,同时确保真实性。所提出的机制具有真实性和均衡性,实现了个人理性、消费者主权和预算平衡。它证明了近似率。仿真结果表明,与基线方法相比,所提出的机制能将社会福利和服务用户数量分别提高至少 29% 和 9%。这项研究为在智能汽车中更有效地提供资源铺平了道路,最终提升了这些移动计算平台的整体用户体验和能力。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
A truthful double auction mechanism for resource provisioning and elastic service in vehicle computing

Intelligent vehicles, equipped with powerful computing and sensing resources, serve as versatile mobile computing platforms, offering many resources to users. This study focuses on resource provisioning and elastic service to address the paramount issue of resource provisioning for in-vehicle computing. It introduces an elastic sensing service, enabling users to declare multiple requested areas to obtain sensing data. It allows various vehicles to collaborate in providing services to a single user when individual vehicles cannot complete the task alone. The approach formulated as a double auction-based setting involves a market with multiple self-interested users and vehicles. The main objective is to design a mechanism that maximizes social welfare. First, a greedy mechanism provides different task allocation strategies while ensuring truthfulness. The proposed mechanism is truthful and equilibrium-driven, achieving individual rationality, consumer sovereignty, and budget balance. It demonstrates the approximation ratio. Simulation results indicate that the proposed mechanism can increase social welfare and the number of served users by at least 29% and 9%, respectively, compared with baseline methods. This research paves the way for more efficient resource provisioning in intelligent vehicles, ultimately enhancing these mobile computing platforms’ overall user experience and capabilities.

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来源期刊
Computer Networks
Computer Networks 工程技术-电信学
CiteScore
10.80
自引率
3.60%
发文量
434
审稿时长
8.6 months
期刊介绍: Computer Networks is an international, archival journal providing a publication vehicle for complete coverage of all topics of interest to those involved in the computer communications networking area. The audience includes researchers, managers and operators of networks as well as designers and implementors. The Editorial Board will consider any material for publication that is of interest to those groups.
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