{"title":"信心保证 2.0 案例","authors":"Robin Bloomfield, John Rushby","doi":"arxiv-2409.10665","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"An assurance case should provide justifiable confidence in the truth of a\nclaim about some critical property of a system or procedure, such as safety or\nsecurity. We consider how confidence can be assessed in the rigorous approach\nwe call Assurance 2.0. Our goal is indefeasible confidence and we approach it from four different\nperspectives: logical soundness, probabilistic assessment, dialectical\nexamination, and residual risks.","PeriodicalId":501278,"journal":{"name":"arXiv - CS - Software Engineering","volume":"23 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2024-09-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Confidence in Assurance 2.0 Cases\",\"authors\":\"Robin Bloomfield, John Rushby\",\"doi\":\"arxiv-2409.10665\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"An assurance case should provide justifiable confidence in the truth of a\\nclaim about some critical property of a system or procedure, such as safety or\\nsecurity. We consider how confidence can be assessed in the rigorous approach\\nwe call Assurance 2.0. Our goal is indefeasible confidence and we approach it from four different\\nperspectives: logical soundness, probabilistic assessment, dialectical\\nexamination, and residual risks.\",\"PeriodicalId\":501278,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"arXiv - CS - Software Engineering\",\"volume\":\"23 1\",\"pages\":\"\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.0000,\"publicationDate\":\"2024-09-16\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"0\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"arXiv - CS - Software Engineering\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/arxiv-2409.10665\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"\",\"JCRName\":\"\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"arXiv - CS - Software Engineering","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/arxiv-2409.10665","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
An assurance case should provide justifiable confidence in the truth of a
claim about some critical property of a system or procedure, such as safety or
security. We consider how confidence can be assessed in the rigorous approach
we call Assurance 2.0. Our goal is indefeasible confidence and we approach it from four different
perspectives: logical soundness, probabilistic assessment, dialectical
examination, and residual risks.