在零售商乐观和信息不对称的情况下,回扣策略与批发订购合同之间的相互作用

IF 4.4 3区 管理学 Q1 OPERATIONS RESEARCH & MANAGEMENT SCIENCE
Yini Zheng, Tiaojun Xiao
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引用次数: 0

摘要

制造商直接向消费者提供返利的制造商返利和制造商通过渠道返利刺激下游零售商销售更多产品的渠道返利是制造商增加销售的两种典型返利策略。考虑到返利促销的普遍性以及下游零售商对消费者返利效果的乐观态度,我们将返利促销、零售商的乐观态度以及相应的信息不对称问题纳入制造商的批发订货合同设计问题中。我们发现,在有返利促销的情况下,批发价格和订货量应该高于没有返利促销的情况。特别是,在制造商返利策略下,批发价和订货量应随着制造商的返利和零售商的乐观情绪而增加。然而,在渠道返利策略下,订货量(批发价)不再受制造商返利(零售商乐观程度)的影响。此外,当零售商的乐观情绪属于私人信息时,两种返利策略下零售商的信息扭曲行为相似,但制造商应接受不同类型的批发价-订货量合同菜单,以揭示零售商的信息并实现利润最大化。具体来说,在制造商返利策略(渠道返利策略)下,对不同类型的零售商签订不同的合同(集合合同)是最优的。此外,在制造商返利策略下,返利的价值会对合同设计起到调节作用。因此,当回扣是外生决定时,制造商可以通过减少回扣来惩罚可能扭曲信息的零售商。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。

Interaction between rebate strategy and wholesale-ordering contracts under retailer optimism and information asymmetry

Interaction between rebate strategy and wholesale-ordering contracts under retailer optimism and information asymmetry

The manufacturer-rebate where the manufacturer directly provides consumer rebates and the channel-rebate where the manufacturer stimulates downstream retailers to sell more products with channel rebates are two typical rebate strategies for manufacturers to increase sales. Considering the prevalence of rebate promotions and the downstream retailer’s optimism on the effect of rebating consumers, we incorporate rebate promotions, retailers’ optimism, and the corresponding information asymmetry issue into the manufacturer’s wholesale-ordering contract design problem. We find that with rebate promotions, the wholesale price and the order quantity should be higher than without rebate promotion. Specially, under the manufacturer-rebate strategy, the wholesale price and the order quantity should increase with the manufacturer’s rebate and the retailer’s optimism. However, under the channel-rebate strategy, the order quantity (the wholesale price) is no longer affected by the manufacturer’s rebate (the retailer’s optimism). Moreover, when the retailer’s optimism is private information, the retailer’s information distortion behaviors under the two rebate strategies are similar, but the manufacturer should accept different kinds of wholesale price-order quantity contract menus to reveal the retailer’s information and maximize profits. Specifically, under the manufacturer-rebate strategy (the channel-rebate strategy), differentiated contracts (a pooling contract) to different types of retailers are optimal. Besides, under the manufacturer-rebate strategy, the value of the rebate can play a moderating role in contract design. Hence, when the rebate is exogenously decided, the manufacturer can punish the retailer who is likely to distort information by decreasing the rebate.

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来源期刊
Annals of Operations Research
Annals of Operations Research 管理科学-运筹学与管理科学
CiteScore
7.90
自引率
16.70%
发文量
596
审稿时长
8.4 months
期刊介绍: The Annals of Operations Research publishes peer-reviewed original articles dealing with key aspects of operations research, including theory, practice, and computation. The journal publishes full-length research articles, short notes, expositions and surveys, reports on computational studies, and case studies that present new and innovative practical applications. In addition to regular issues, the journal publishes periodic special volumes that focus on defined fields of operations research, ranging from the highly theoretical to the algorithmic and the applied. These volumes have one or more Guest Editors who are responsible for collecting the papers and overseeing the refereeing process.
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