{"title":"在零售商乐观和信息不对称的情况下,回扣策略与批发订购合同之间的相互作用","authors":"Yini Zheng, Tiaojun Xiao","doi":"10.1007/s10479-024-06269-x","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"<p>The manufacturer-rebate where the manufacturer directly provides consumer rebates and the channel-rebate where the manufacturer stimulates downstream retailers to sell more products with channel rebates are two typical rebate strategies for manufacturers to increase sales. Considering the prevalence of rebate promotions and the downstream retailer’s optimism on the effect of rebating consumers, we incorporate rebate promotions, retailers’ optimism, and the corresponding information asymmetry issue into the manufacturer’s wholesale-ordering contract design problem. We find that with rebate promotions, the wholesale price and the order quantity should be higher than without rebate promotion. Specially, under the manufacturer-rebate strategy, the wholesale price and the order quantity should increase with the manufacturer’s rebate and the retailer’s optimism. However, under the channel-rebate strategy, the order quantity (the wholesale price) is no longer affected by the manufacturer’s rebate (the retailer’s optimism). Moreover, when the retailer’s optimism is private information, the retailer’s information distortion behaviors under the two rebate strategies are similar, but the manufacturer should accept different kinds of wholesale price-order quantity contract menus to reveal the retailer’s information and maximize profits. Specifically, under the manufacturer-rebate strategy (the channel-rebate strategy), differentiated contracts (a pooling contract) to different types of retailers are optimal. Besides, under the manufacturer-rebate strategy, the value of the rebate can play a moderating role in contract design. Hence, when the rebate is exogenously decided, the manufacturer can punish the retailer who is likely to distort information by decreasing the rebate.</p>","PeriodicalId":8215,"journal":{"name":"Annals of Operations Research","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":4.4000,"publicationDate":"2024-09-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Interaction between rebate strategy and wholesale-ordering contracts under retailer optimism and information asymmetry\",\"authors\":\"Yini Zheng, Tiaojun Xiao\",\"doi\":\"10.1007/s10479-024-06269-x\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"<p>The manufacturer-rebate where the manufacturer directly provides consumer rebates and the channel-rebate where the manufacturer stimulates downstream retailers to sell more products with channel rebates are two typical rebate strategies for manufacturers to increase sales. Considering the prevalence of rebate promotions and the downstream retailer’s optimism on the effect of rebating consumers, we incorporate rebate promotions, retailers’ optimism, and the corresponding information asymmetry issue into the manufacturer’s wholesale-ordering contract design problem. We find that with rebate promotions, the wholesale price and the order quantity should be higher than without rebate promotion. Specially, under the manufacturer-rebate strategy, the wholesale price and the order quantity should increase with the manufacturer’s rebate and the retailer’s optimism. However, under the channel-rebate strategy, the order quantity (the wholesale price) is no longer affected by the manufacturer’s rebate (the retailer’s optimism). Moreover, when the retailer’s optimism is private information, the retailer’s information distortion behaviors under the two rebate strategies are similar, but the manufacturer should accept different kinds of wholesale price-order quantity contract menus to reveal the retailer’s information and maximize profits. Specifically, under the manufacturer-rebate strategy (the channel-rebate strategy), differentiated contracts (a pooling contract) to different types of retailers are optimal. Besides, under the manufacturer-rebate strategy, the value of the rebate can play a moderating role in contract design. Hence, when the rebate is exogenously decided, the manufacturer can punish the retailer who is likely to distort information by decreasing the rebate.</p>\",\"PeriodicalId\":8215,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Annals of Operations Research\",\"volume\":null,\"pages\":null},\"PeriodicalIF\":4.4000,\"publicationDate\":\"2024-09-16\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"0\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Annals of Operations Research\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"91\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.1007/s10479-024-06269-x\",\"RegionNum\":3,\"RegionCategory\":\"管理学\",\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"Q1\",\"JCRName\":\"OPERATIONS RESEARCH & MANAGEMENT SCIENCE\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Annals of Operations Research","FirstCategoryId":"91","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s10479-024-06269-x","RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q1","JCRName":"OPERATIONS RESEARCH & MANAGEMENT SCIENCE","Score":null,"Total":0}
Interaction between rebate strategy and wholesale-ordering contracts under retailer optimism and information asymmetry
The manufacturer-rebate where the manufacturer directly provides consumer rebates and the channel-rebate where the manufacturer stimulates downstream retailers to sell more products with channel rebates are two typical rebate strategies for manufacturers to increase sales. Considering the prevalence of rebate promotions and the downstream retailer’s optimism on the effect of rebating consumers, we incorporate rebate promotions, retailers’ optimism, and the corresponding information asymmetry issue into the manufacturer’s wholesale-ordering contract design problem. We find that with rebate promotions, the wholesale price and the order quantity should be higher than without rebate promotion. Specially, under the manufacturer-rebate strategy, the wholesale price and the order quantity should increase with the manufacturer’s rebate and the retailer’s optimism. However, under the channel-rebate strategy, the order quantity (the wholesale price) is no longer affected by the manufacturer’s rebate (the retailer’s optimism). Moreover, when the retailer’s optimism is private information, the retailer’s information distortion behaviors under the two rebate strategies are similar, but the manufacturer should accept different kinds of wholesale price-order quantity contract menus to reveal the retailer’s information and maximize profits. Specifically, under the manufacturer-rebate strategy (the channel-rebate strategy), differentiated contracts (a pooling contract) to different types of retailers are optimal. Besides, under the manufacturer-rebate strategy, the value of the rebate can play a moderating role in contract design. Hence, when the rebate is exogenously decided, the manufacturer can punish the retailer who is likely to distort information by decreasing the rebate.
期刊介绍:
The Annals of Operations Research publishes peer-reviewed original articles dealing with key aspects of operations research, including theory, practice, and computation. The journal publishes full-length research articles, short notes, expositions and surveys, reports on computational studies, and case studies that present new and innovative practical applications.
In addition to regular issues, the journal publishes periodic special volumes that focus on defined fields of operations research, ranging from the highly theoretical to the algorithmic and the applied. These volumes have one or more Guest Editors who are responsible for collecting the papers and overseeing the refereeing process.