2007 年金融危机和 COVID-19 健康危机爆发时的 CEO 权力与公司风险:国际证据

IF 1.9 Q2 BUSINESS, FINANCE
Hamad Aldawsari, Taufiq Choudhry, Di Luo
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引用次数: 0

摘要

我们研究了 2007 年全球金融危机和 2020 年 COVID-19 大流行病健康危机爆发时首席执行官权力与公司风险之间的关联。通过对 2006 至 2021 年间 G7 国家上市公司的国际样本进行研究,我们发现,CEO 权力较大的公司比 CEO 权力较小的公司面临更高的风险。导致这一结果的主要原因是首席执行官权力对特异性风险而非系统性风险的影响。此外,我们还发现,在没有参照物或经验的危机中,有权力的首席执行官往往更加谨慎和保守,比如在大流行病的情况下,权力与风险的正相关关系就不那么明显。尽管如此,在人们更为熟悉的金融危机中,权力与风险的关联仍然相对不变。这项研究对企业、投资者、监管者和政策制定者具有重要意义。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
CEO power and firm risk at the onset of the 2007 financial crisis and the COVID-19 health crisis: international evidence

We investigate the association between CEO power and firm risk at the onset of the global financial crisis in 2007 and the COVID-19 pandemic health crisis in 2020. Examining an international sample of publicly listed firms in the G7 nations between 2006 and 2021, we show that firms led by CEOs with greater power are exposed to higher risk than firms led by CEOs with lesser power. The result is primarily driven by the impact of CEO power on idiosyncratic risk rather than systematic risk. Further, we find that powerful CEOs tend to be more cautious and conservative during crises that they have no reference for or experience of, as in the case of the pandemic, during which the positive power–risk associations are less pronounced. Nevertheless, the power–risk association remains relatively unchanged during the more familiar financial crisis. This study has important implications for firms, investors, regulators, and policymakers.

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来源期刊
CiteScore
3.20
自引率
17.60%
发文量
87
期刊介绍: Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting deals with research involving the interaction of finance with accounting, economics, and quantitative methods, focused on finance and accounting. The papers published present useful theoretical and methodological results with the support of interesting empirical applications. Purely theoretical and methodological research with the potential for important applications is also published. Besides the traditional high-quality theoretical and empirical research in finance, the journal also publishes papers dealing with interdisciplinary topics.
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