{"title":"首席执行官薪酬风险和薪酬运气不对称","authors":"Yixi Ning, Ke Zhong, Lihong Chen","doi":"10.1108/raf-03-2023-0095","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"<h3>Purpose</h3>\n<p>This study aims to examine the effect of CEO compensation risk, as measured by the proportion of equity-based pay (option and stock awards) relative to total compensation and pay sensitivity to stock volatility, on CEO pay for luck asymmetry. This paper also empirically examines CEO compensation risk as a mediating variable between the regulatory changes and CEO pay for luck asymmetry.</p><!--/ Abstract__block -->\n<h3>Design/methodology/approach</h3>\n<p>This paper test the proposed two hypothesis that CEO compensation risk is positively associated with the degree of CEO pay for luck asymmetry; and the pay related regulations implemented around 2006 could mitigate the degree of CEO pay for luck asymmetry using the fixed-effects regression models.</p><!--/ Abstract__block -->\n<h3>Findings</h3>\n<p>Consistent with the managerial talent retention hypothesis, this paper finds that CEO compensation risk, as measured by the equity-based pay as a proportion of CEO total compensation and CEO pay sensitivity to stock volatility, is positively associated with the degree of CEO pay for luck asymmetry. In addition, this paper find that CEO pay for luck asymmetry is significantly reduced by the major regulatory changes on executive compensation implemented around 2006.</p><!--/ Abstract__block -->\n<h3>Research limitations/implications</h3>\n<p>This study is among the very few studies exploring the impact of CEO compensation risk on pay for luck asymmetry in the literature. While the major purpose of the widely used stock options is to align executive interests and shareholder values, it also tends to increase the risk level of CEO compensation. So, a well-designed CEO pay package should protect risk-averse CEOs from bad luck for the retention purpose, which is also beneficial to shareholder wealth maximization. Therefore, future research on executive compensation needs to examine the issue from various perspectives.</p><!--/ Abstract__block -->\n<h3>Practical implications</h3>\n<p>For board of directors who is responsible for the compensation of CEOs, it is necessary to consider a broad range of factors when designing an optimal CEO pay package.</p><!--/ Abstract__block -->\n<h3>Social implications</h3>\n<p>The findings on the impact of regulations on CEO pay for luck asymmetry suggest that the executive-pay-related regulations around 2006 have indeed achieved some of their intended goals to significantly lower pay for nonperformance asymmetry, whereby CEO pay sensitivity to stock volatility has been identified as a major mediating variable.</p><!--/ Abstract__block -->\n<h3>Originality/value</h3>\n<p>This study contributes to the literature on executive pay for luck asymmetry in several perspectives. 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引用次数: 0
摘要
目的本研究旨在探讨首席执行官薪酬风险对首席执行官薪酬运气不对称的影响，首席执行官薪酬风险是以股权薪酬（期权和股票奖励）占总薪酬的比例以及薪酬对股票波动的敏感性来衡量的。本文还实证检验了首席执行官薪酬风险作为监管变化与首席执行官薪酬运气不对称之间的中介变量的作用。本文使用固定效应回归模型检验了提出的两个假设，即首席执行官薪酬风险与首席执行官薪酬运气不对称程度正相关；2006 年前后实施的薪酬相关法规可以减轻首席执行官薪酬运气不对称程度。研究结果与管理人才保留假说相一致，本文发现，以股权薪酬占 CEO 薪酬总额的比例和 CEO 薪酬对股票波动的敏感性来衡量的 CEO 薪酬风险与 CEO 薪酬运气不对称程度呈正相关。此外，本文还发现，2006 年前后对高管薪酬实施的重大监管变革大大降低了首席执行官薪酬的运气不对称程度。 研究局限/意义 本研究是文献中极少数探讨首席执行官薪酬风险对薪酬运气不对称影响的研究之一。虽然广泛使用股票期权的主要目的是使高管利益与股东价值相一致，但它也往往会增加 CEO 薪酬的风险水平。因此，精心设计的首席执行官薪酬方案应保护风险规避型首席执行官免遭厄运，以达到留住人才的目的，这也有利于股东财富的最大化。对于负责 CEO 薪酬的董事会来说，在设计最佳 CEO 薪酬方案时有必要考虑广泛的因素。社会意义法规对首席执行官薪酬运气不对称的影响研究结果表明，2006 年前后出台的与高管薪酬相关的法规确实实现了部分预期目标，显著降低了非业绩不对称薪酬，其中首席执行官薪酬对股票波动的敏感性被认为是一个主要的中介变量。首先，本文发现 CEO 薪酬风险对 CEO 薪酬运气不对称程度有积极影响。其次，本文发现，2006 年美国开始实施各种高管薪酬监管改革后，CEO 薪酬运气不对称现象得到了缓解。就作者所知，本研究是文献中极少数调查这些问题的研究之一。
This study aims to examine the effect of CEO compensation risk, as measured by the proportion of equity-based pay (option and stock awards) relative to total compensation and pay sensitivity to stock volatility, on CEO pay for luck asymmetry. This paper also empirically examines CEO compensation risk as a mediating variable between the regulatory changes and CEO pay for luck asymmetry.
Design/methodology/approach
This paper test the proposed two hypothesis that CEO compensation risk is positively associated with the degree of CEO pay for luck asymmetry; and the pay related regulations implemented around 2006 could mitigate the degree of CEO pay for luck asymmetry using the fixed-effects regression models.
Findings
Consistent with the managerial talent retention hypothesis, this paper finds that CEO compensation risk, as measured by the equity-based pay as a proportion of CEO total compensation and CEO pay sensitivity to stock volatility, is positively associated with the degree of CEO pay for luck asymmetry. In addition, this paper find that CEO pay for luck asymmetry is significantly reduced by the major regulatory changes on executive compensation implemented around 2006.
Research limitations/implications
This study is among the very few studies exploring the impact of CEO compensation risk on pay for luck asymmetry in the literature. While the major purpose of the widely used stock options is to align executive interests and shareholder values, it also tends to increase the risk level of CEO compensation. So, a well-designed CEO pay package should protect risk-averse CEOs from bad luck for the retention purpose, which is also beneficial to shareholder wealth maximization. Therefore, future research on executive compensation needs to examine the issue from various perspectives.
Practical implications
For board of directors who is responsible for the compensation of CEOs, it is necessary to consider a broad range of factors when designing an optimal CEO pay package.
Social implications
The findings on the impact of regulations on CEO pay for luck asymmetry suggest that the executive-pay-related regulations around 2006 have indeed achieved some of their intended goals to significantly lower pay for nonperformance asymmetry, whereby CEO pay sensitivity to stock volatility has been identified as a major mediating variable.
Originality/value
This study contributes to the literature on executive pay for luck asymmetry in several perspectives. First, this paper finds that CEO compensation risk has a positive impact on the degree of CEO pay for luck asymmetry. Second, this paper finds that the CEO pay for luck asymmetry has been mitigated after 2006 when various regulatory changes on executive compensation began to be implemented in the USA. To the best of the authors’ knowledge, this study is among the very few studies investigating these issues in the literature.
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