政府补贴下批发价格受限的低碳供应链中的决策与协调

IF 9.8 1区 工程技术 Q1 ENGINEERING, INDUSTRIAL
Fuxia Ren, Benyong Hu
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引用次数: 0

摘要

受满足具有碳意识的消费者和碳法规的挑战的激励,本文阐述了具有批发价格约束(WPC)的低碳供应链中的决策和协调。批发价格约束是指大型零售商(如沃尔玛、亚马逊和 E.Leclerc)追求利润率不低于一定水平的行为,这会影响供应链的运营。首先,我们建立了一个竞争模型,揭示了 WPC 会导致供应链总利润的损失和碳减排量的不足,进而提出了系统性挑战。随后,我们设计了一个基于纳什讨价还价的合作模型,表明该模型可以协调供应链,并根据企业的讨价还价能力实现最优利润的连续分配。最后,我们的扩展分析纳入了政府对低碳技术补贴的外部影响,并设计了最优补贴机制。结果表明,政府补贴虽然可以减轻供应商的成本压力,激励其减少碳排放,但同时也会诱使零售商为获得更大利润而设定更高的 WPC,因此绩效损失依然突出。在这种情况下,我们构建了一个基于纳什讨价还价的合作模型,可以协调供应链。总之,我们的见解可以帮助企业实现科学的碳减排和制定合理的 WPC,并为政府的碳法规提供量化依据。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Decisions and coordination in low-carbon supply chains with a wholesale price constraint under government subsidies

Motivated by the challenge of meeting carbon-conscious consumers and carbon regulations, this paper expounded on the decisions and coordination in low-carbon supply chains with a wholesale price constraint (WPC). The WPC is the behavior of large retailers (e.g., Walmart, Amazon, and E.Leclerc) that pursue a profit margin that does not fall below a certain level, which can affect supply chain operations. First, we develop a competition model, revealing that the WPC can result in a loss of total supply chain profit and a shortage in carbon emission reduction and then pose systematic challenges. Following this, we design a Nash bargaining-based cooperation model, showing that it can coordinate the supply chain and achieve a continuous allocation of optimal profits according to the bargaining power of firms. Lastly, our extended analysis incorporates the external influence of government subsidies for low-carbon technologies and designs the optimal subsidy mechanism. We demonstrate that, while government subsidies can reduce cost pressures on the supplier and provide incentives to reduce carbon emission, they can also induce the retailer to set a higher WPC for greater profitability, so the performance loss remains prominent. In this circumstance, we construct a Nash bargaining-based cooperation model that can coordinate the supply chain. Overall, our insights can help firms achieve scientific carbon emission reduction and formulate a reasonable WPC, as well as provide a quantitative basis for government carbon regulations.

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来源期刊
International Journal of Production Economics
International Journal of Production Economics 管理科学-工程:工业
CiteScore
21.40
自引率
7.50%
发文量
266
审稿时长
52 days
期刊介绍: The International Journal of Production Economics focuses on the interface between engineering and management. It covers all aspects of manufacturing and process industries, as well as production in general. The journal is interdisciplinary, considering activities throughout the product life cycle and material flow cycle. It aims to disseminate knowledge for improving industrial practice and strengthening the theoretical base for decision making. The journal serves as a forum for exchanging ideas and presenting new developments in theory and application, combining academic standards with practical value for industrial applications.
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