{"title":"能力受限验证的最优分配","authors":"Albin Erlanson, Andreas Kleiner","doi":"arxiv-2409.02031","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"A principal has $m$ identical objects to allocate among a group of $n$\nagents. Objects are desirable and the principal's value of assigning an object\nto an agent is the agent's private information. The principal can verify up to\n$k$ agents, where $k<m$, thereby perfectly learning the types of those\nverified. We find the mechanism that maximizes the principal's expected utility\nwhen no monetary transfers are available. In this mechanism, an agent receives\nan object if (i) his type is above a cutoff and among the $m$ highest types,\n(ii) his type is above some lower cutoff but among the $k$ highest types, or\n(iii) he receives an object in a lottery that allocates the remaining objects\nrandomly.","PeriodicalId":501188,"journal":{"name":"arXiv - ECON - Theoretical Economics","volume":"45 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2024-09-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Optimal allocations with capacity constrained verification\",\"authors\":\"Albin Erlanson, Andreas Kleiner\",\"doi\":\"arxiv-2409.02031\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"A principal has $m$ identical objects to allocate among a group of $n$\\nagents. Objects are desirable and the principal's value of assigning an object\\nto an agent is the agent's private information. The principal can verify up to\\n$k$ agents, where $k<m$, thereby perfectly learning the types of those\\nverified. We find the mechanism that maximizes the principal's expected utility\\nwhen no monetary transfers are available. In this mechanism, an agent receives\\nan object if (i) his type is above a cutoff and among the $m$ highest types,\\n(ii) his type is above some lower cutoff but among the $k$ highest types, or\\n(iii) he receives an object in a lottery that allocates the remaining objects\\nrandomly.\",\"PeriodicalId\":501188,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"arXiv - ECON - Theoretical Economics\",\"volume\":\"45 1\",\"pages\":\"\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.0000,\"publicationDate\":\"2024-09-03\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"0\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"arXiv - ECON - Theoretical Economics\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/arxiv-2409.02031\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"\",\"JCRName\":\"\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"arXiv - ECON - Theoretical Economics","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/arxiv-2409.02031","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
Optimal allocations with capacity constrained verification
A principal has $m$ identical objects to allocate among a group of $n$
agents. Objects are desirable and the principal's value of assigning an object
to an agent is the agent's private information. The principal can verify up to
$k$ agents, where $k
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