自我欺骗:民间概念结构案例研究

IF 1.8 Q2 PSYCHOLOGY, MULTIDISCIPLINARY
Carme Isern-Mas, Ivar R. Hannikainen
{"title":"自我欺骗:民间概念结构案例研究","authors":"Carme Isern-Mas, Ivar R. Hannikainen","doi":"10.1007/s13164-024-00743-y","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"<p>Theoretical debates around the concept of self-deception revolve around identifying the conditions for a behavior to qualify as self-deception. Experiments 1 and 2 revealed that various candidate features—such as intent, belief change, and motive—are treated as sufficient, but non-necessary, conditions according to the lay concept of self-deception. This led us to ask whether there are multiple lay concepts, such that different participants endorse competing theories (the disagreement view), or whether individual participants assign partial weight to various features and consequently waver in cases of middling similarity (the conflict view). In Experiment 3, by-participant regression models uncovered that most participants additively consider multiple characteristics of the prototype of self-deception, while only a minority of participants treat a characteristic (or a combination thereof) as necessary and sufficient. In sum, by disambiguating interpersonal disagreement and intrapersonal conflict in a within-subjects design, the present experiments indicate that the lay concept may primarily exhibit a prototype structure. In closing, we suggest that future research deploying this method may help to explain why experimental research on philosophical concepts often engenders partial support for competing theories.</p>","PeriodicalId":47055,"journal":{"name":"Review of Philosophy and Psychology","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.8000,"publicationDate":"2024-08-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Self-Deception: A Case Study in Folk Conceptual Structure\",\"authors\":\"Carme Isern-Mas, Ivar R. Hannikainen\",\"doi\":\"10.1007/s13164-024-00743-y\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"<p>Theoretical debates around the concept of self-deception revolve around identifying the conditions for a behavior to qualify as self-deception. Experiments 1 and 2 revealed that various candidate features—such as intent, belief change, and motive—are treated as sufficient, but non-necessary, conditions according to the lay concept of self-deception. This led us to ask whether there are multiple lay concepts, such that different participants endorse competing theories (the disagreement view), or whether individual participants assign partial weight to various features and consequently waver in cases of middling similarity (the conflict view). In Experiment 3, by-participant regression models uncovered that most participants additively consider multiple characteristics of the prototype of self-deception, while only a minority of participants treat a characteristic (or a combination thereof) as necessary and sufficient. In sum, by disambiguating interpersonal disagreement and intrapersonal conflict in a within-subjects design, the present experiments indicate that the lay concept may primarily exhibit a prototype structure. In closing, we suggest that future research deploying this method may help to explain why experimental research on philosophical concepts often engenders partial support for competing theories.</p>\",\"PeriodicalId\":47055,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Review of Philosophy and Psychology\",\"volume\":null,\"pages\":null},\"PeriodicalIF\":1.8000,\"publicationDate\":\"2024-08-15\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"0\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Review of Philosophy and Psychology\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.1007/s13164-024-00743-y\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"Q2\",\"JCRName\":\"PSYCHOLOGY, MULTIDISCIPLINARY\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Review of Philosophy and Psychology","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s13164-024-00743-y","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q2","JCRName":"PSYCHOLOGY, MULTIDISCIPLINARY","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0

摘要

围绕自欺概念的理论争论主要集中在确定一种行为符合自欺条件的问题上。实验 1 和 2 显示,根据非专业人士的自欺概念,各种候选特征--如意图、信念改变和动机--被视为充分但非必要的条件。这让我们想到,是否存在多种非专业概念,以至于不同的参与者支持相互竞争的理论(分歧观点),或者是否个别参与者对各种特征赋予了部分权重,从而在相似度中等的情况下摇摆不定(冲突观点)。在实验 3 中,通过参与者回归模型发现,大多数参与者会加法考虑自我欺骗原型的多个特征,而只有少数参与者会将某一特征(或其组合)视为必要且充分的特征。总之,通过在被试内设计中区分人际分歧和人际冲突,本实验表明外行概念可能主要表现出一种原型结构。最后,我们建议未来的研究采用这种方法,这可能有助于解释为什么有关哲学概念的实验研究经常为相互竞争的理论提供部分支持。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。

Self-Deception: A Case Study in Folk Conceptual Structure

Self-Deception: A Case Study in Folk Conceptual Structure

Theoretical debates around the concept of self-deception revolve around identifying the conditions for a behavior to qualify as self-deception. Experiments 1 and 2 revealed that various candidate features—such as intent, belief change, and motive—are treated as sufficient, but non-necessary, conditions according to the lay concept of self-deception. This led us to ask whether there are multiple lay concepts, such that different participants endorse competing theories (the disagreement view), or whether individual participants assign partial weight to various features and consequently waver in cases of middling similarity (the conflict view). In Experiment 3, by-participant regression models uncovered that most participants additively consider multiple characteristics of the prototype of self-deception, while only a minority of participants treat a characteristic (or a combination thereof) as necessary and sufficient. In sum, by disambiguating interpersonal disagreement and intrapersonal conflict in a within-subjects design, the present experiments indicate that the lay concept may primarily exhibit a prototype structure. In closing, we suggest that future research deploying this method may help to explain why experimental research on philosophical concepts often engenders partial support for competing theories.

求助全文
通过发布文献求助,成功后即可免费获取论文全文。 去求助
来源期刊
Review of Philosophy and Psychology
Review of Philosophy and Psychology PSYCHOLOGY, MULTIDISCIPLINARY-
CiteScore
4.70
自引率
5.00%
发文量
60
期刊介绍: The Review of Philosophy and Psychology is a peer-reviewed journal focusing on philosophical and foundational issues in cognitive science. The aim of the journal is to provide a forum for discussion on topics of mutual interest to philosophers and psychologists and to foster interdisciplinary research at the crossroads of philosophy and the sciences of the mind, including the neural, behavioural and social sciences. The journal publishes theoretical works grounded in empirical research as well as empirical articles on issues of philosophical relevance. It includes thematic issues featuring invited contributions from leading authors together with articles answering a call for papers. The Review of Philosophy and Psychology is published quarterly and is hosted at the Jean Nicod Institute, a research centre of the French Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique. It was formerly published as the "European Review of Philosophy" by CSLI Publications, Stanford.
×
引用
GB/T 7714-2015
复制
MLA
复制
APA
复制
导出至
BibTeX EndNote RefMan NoteFirst NoteExpress
×
提示
您的信息不完整,为了账户安全,请先补充。
现在去补充
×
提示
您因"违规操作"
具体请查看互助需知
我知道了
×
提示
确定
请完成安全验证×
copy
已复制链接
快去分享给好友吧!
我知道了
右上角分享
点击右上角分享
0
联系我们:info@booksci.cn Book学术提供免费学术资源搜索服务,方便国内外学者检索中英文文献。致力于提供最便捷和优质的服务体验。 Copyright © 2023 布克学术 All rights reserved.
京ICP备2023020795号-1
ghs 京公网安备 11010802042870号
Book学术文献互助
Book学术文献互助群
群 号:481959085
Book学术官方微信