有补贴的加权无羡慕分配

arXiv - CS - Computer Science and Game Theory Pub Date : 2024-08-16 DOI:arxiv-2408.08711

Haris Aziz, Xin Huang, Kei Kimura, Indrajit Saha, Zhaohong Sun Mashbat Suzuki, Makoto Yokoo

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引用次数: 0

摘要

我们考虑的是代理人拥有加权权益时的补贴公平分配问题。在强调了与非加权情况的几个重要区别后，我们提出了有关加权无嫉妒性的几个结果，包括一般特征、实现和测试加权无嫉妒性的算法、非浪费和无嫉妒分配的最坏情况补贴的下限和上限，以及实现加权无嫉妒性和其他属性的算法。

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Weighted Envy-free Allocation with Subsidy

We consider the problem of fair allocation with subsidy when agents have weighted entitlements. After highlighting several important differences from the unweighted cases, we present several results concerning weighted envy-freeability including general characterizations, algorithms for achieving and testing weighted envy-freeability, lower and upper bounds for worst case subsidy for non-wasteful and envy-freeable allocations, and algorithms for achieving weighted envy-freeability along with other properties.

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arXiv - CS - Computer Science and Game Theory

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