{"title":"罪恶税","authors":"Johannes Kasinger","doi":"arxiv-2409.01493","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"Strategic shrouding of taxes by profit-maximizing firms can impair the\neffectiveness of corrective taxes. This paper explores tax shrouding and its\nconsequences after the introduction of a digital sin tax designed to discourage\nharmful overconsumption of online sports betting in Germany. In response to the\ntax reform, most firms strategically shroud the tax, i.e., exclude tax\nsurcharges from posted prices. Using an extensive novel panel data set on\nonline betting odds, I causally estimate the effect of the tax on consumer\nbetting prices. Consumers bear, on average, 76% of the tax burden. There is\nconsiderable and long-lasting heterogeneity in effects conditional on shrouding\npractices. Firms that shroud taxes can pass 90% of the tax onto consumers,\nwhile the pass-through rate is 16% for firms that directly post tax-inclusive\nprices. To understand the results' underlying mechanisms and policy\nimplications, I propose an optimal corrective taxation model where\noligopolistic firms compete on base prices and can shroud additive taxes. Tax\nshrouding is only attainable in equilibrium if (some) consumers underreact to\nshrouded attributes. According to the theoretical predictions, the empirically\nidentified heterogeneity suggests that strategic tax shrouding significantly\nattenuates the positive corrective welfare effects of the tax. The results\nprompt regulating shrouding practices in the context of corrective taxation.","PeriodicalId":501273,"journal":{"name":"arXiv - ECON - General Economics","volume":"60 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2024-09-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Shrouded Sin Taxes\",\"authors\":\"Johannes Kasinger\",\"doi\":\"arxiv-2409.01493\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"Strategic shrouding of taxes by profit-maximizing firms can impair the\\neffectiveness of corrective taxes. This paper explores tax shrouding and its\\nconsequences after the introduction of a digital sin tax designed to discourage\\nharmful overconsumption of online sports betting in Germany. In response to the\\ntax reform, most firms strategically shroud the tax, i.e., exclude tax\\nsurcharges from posted prices. Using an extensive novel panel data set on\\nonline betting odds, I causally estimate the effect of the tax on consumer\\nbetting prices. Consumers bear, on average, 76% of the tax burden. There is\\nconsiderable and long-lasting heterogeneity in effects conditional on shrouding\\npractices. Firms that shroud taxes can pass 90% of the tax onto consumers,\\nwhile the pass-through rate is 16% for firms that directly post tax-inclusive\\nprices. To understand the results' underlying mechanisms and policy\\nimplications, I propose an optimal corrective taxation model where\\noligopolistic firms compete on base prices and can shroud additive taxes. Tax\\nshrouding is only attainable in equilibrium if (some) consumers underreact to\\nshrouded attributes. According to the theoretical predictions, the empirically\\nidentified heterogeneity suggests that strategic tax shrouding significantly\\nattenuates the positive corrective welfare effects of the tax. The results\\nprompt regulating shrouding practices in the context of corrective taxation.\",\"PeriodicalId\":501273,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"arXiv - ECON - General Economics\",\"volume\":\"60 1\",\"pages\":\"\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.0000,\"publicationDate\":\"2024-09-02\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"0\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"arXiv - ECON - General Economics\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/arxiv-2409.01493\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"\",\"JCRName\":\"\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"arXiv - ECON - General Economics","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/arxiv-2409.01493","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
Strategic shrouding of taxes by profit-maximizing firms can impair the
effectiveness of corrective taxes. This paper explores tax shrouding and its
consequences after the introduction of a digital sin tax designed to discourage
harmful overconsumption of online sports betting in Germany. In response to the
tax reform, most firms strategically shroud the tax, i.e., exclude tax
surcharges from posted prices. Using an extensive novel panel data set on
online betting odds, I causally estimate the effect of the tax on consumer
betting prices. Consumers bear, on average, 76% of the tax burden. There is
considerable and long-lasting heterogeneity in effects conditional on shrouding
practices. Firms that shroud taxes can pass 90% of the tax onto consumers,
while the pass-through rate is 16% for firms that directly post tax-inclusive
prices. To understand the results' underlying mechanisms and policy
implications, I propose an optimal corrective taxation model where
oligopolistic firms compete on base prices and can shroud additive taxes. Tax
shrouding is only attainable in equilibrium if (some) consumers underreact to
shrouded attributes. According to the theoretical predictions, the empirically
identified heterogeneity suggests that strategic tax shrouding significantly
attenuates the positive corrective welfare effects of the tax. The results
prompt regulating shrouding practices in the context of corrective taxation.