有连续动作的竞赛实验研究

Arthur B. Nelson, Dmitry Ryvkin
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引用次数: 0

摘要

我们通过实验研究了参赛者按顺序做出投资决策的竞赛,并在两个阶段之间揭示了先前的投资信息。我们采用主体间设计,考虑了三位参赛者竞赛中所有可能的顺序,并检验了亚博弈完全纳什均衡的两个主要比较静态:阶段数对总投资和先行者优势的积极影响。我们发现,当比赛中加入更多的信息披露阶段时,总投资会减少。关于先行者优势的证据好坏参半,但大多也不支持理论。这两个预测都主要依赖于先行者的大量先发制人投资和后发者的迁就,但这并没有实现。相反,后发者对先行者的投资做出了积极的、互惠的回应,而先行者则学会了适应这些回应。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Contests with sequential moves: An experimental study
We study experimentally contests in which players make investment decisions sequentially, and information on prior investments is revealed between stages. Using a between-subject design, we consider all possible sequences in contests of three players and test two major comparative statics of the subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium: The positive effect of the number of stages on aggregate investment and earlier mover advantage. The former prediction is decidedly rejected, as we observe a reduction in aggregate investment when more sequential information disclosure stages are added to the contest. The evidence on earlier mover advantage is mixed but mostly does not support theory as well. Both predictions rely critically on large preemptive investment by first movers and accommodation by later movers, which does not materialize. Instead, later movers respond aggressively, and reciprocally, to first movers' investments, while first movers learn to accommodate those responses.
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